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1. Introduction
In this paper, we focus on power relations, networks and public
participation in planning practice. We note how attempts over four
decades to boost participation have come from a number of
perspectives in planning theory – advocacy, radical/transactive,
collaborative and Deleuzian – each based on a critique of prior
theory and practice (Davidoff, 1965; Forester, 1989; Friedmann,
1973; Harvey, 1973; Hillier, 2008). Advocates of these perspectives
regard power relations as being mediated through state-led national
planning systems, and asymmetric differences in power as
responsible, in large part, for negative outcomes in social and
environmental terms. Such critiques spurred on and overlap with
the environmental justice literature. These critiques and the
empirical evidence for them are made via recourse to normative
approaches ‘needed’ to overcome the democratic deﬁcits said to be
inherent in the planning system (Bullard, 1990; Walker, 2012).
Practical change to planning can be achieved by boosting
community and individual participation in the planning process.
Although this debate started in the 1960s, it still matters today in
terms of how planning is conceived of and practiced. Planning
theorists and practitioners continue to explore the ontological
question of how actors’ perceptions of the world alter under
conditions of uncertainty (cf. Christensen, 1985). This theoretical
picture suggests planning practice is permeated by power relations.
Getting approaches to public participation right also matters to
a profession whose political legitimacy, based on its technical,
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A B S T R A C T
Understanding the nature of power relations has been integral to debates in planning theory and
planning practice since the 1960s. Current theoretical approaches to planning and power have evolved to
a state of pluralism which impacts upon how planning is conceived of and practiced. We seek to examine
power relations and knowledge via a multidisciplinary case study of an energy-from-waste (EfW)
development based in South Wales. Centred on a highly contested technology, incineration, this case
study incorporates in-depth, longitudinal interview data with social network analysis to build up a
picture of competing framings of environmental health risk. In local environmental debates, planners are
expected to be able to help resolve competition between conﬂicting interests and yet, in reality, such
conﬂicts often appear intractable and have long been dubbed wicked problems. This is especially the
case for waste management. In our in-depth case study, signiﬁcant pre-existing power relations existed
between the local planning authority (LPA), which was also the lead co-developer in the EfW project, and
the local community. In terms of methods, we have been keen to unearth data that allows us to explore
the nature of institutional and networked power as it plays out within a community over time. It is our
contention that too often the dynamics of power have been underplayed because it is studied as a
snapshot rather than over time. Here we have utilised a variety of methods – from key person interviews
to social network analysis – to examine the application for development, the operation of the EfW and
the closure of the plant – over a ten year time frame. By drawing upon a rich database we can better
understand the ways in which, in the case of particularly contentious developments, power relations
greatly hampered efforts at public participation. Our nuanced methodological approach reveals
empirical evidence for tensions in theoretical approaches to power relations in the planning arena and
we can identify how debates can move forward based on a more geographically informed perspective.
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managerial and political expertise, is continually recast (cf. Rein,
1969). From the public’s point of view, hoped-for gains in
democratising national planning systems have not diffused at
anything like the rate that early proponents of change initially
anticipated (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Radical change has not
occurred in part because planners deal with ‘wicked problems’
(Rittel & Webber, 1973). These social policy problems are
evidenced in intractable land-use contestations between rival
stakeholders. Policy solutions that are dependent upon technical
expertise cannot necessarily be found in a ‘rational’ way by state
managers or bureaucrats.
The paper makes a signiﬁcant contribution to current debates
on environmental planning and power. At its heart is a longitudinal
case study approach which enables analysis of how debates on
development continue after a decision has been made. Power
relations are constantly made and remade as actors and networks
interact or events move to the fore (such as the granting of a licence
to operate). This suggests that actor and networks based on
asymmetric power relations remain embedded in communities (cf.
Hacking & Flynn, 2014). We offer a theoretical approach to the
study of power relations, planning and public participation which
suggests that planners need to operate with a variety of theoretical
perspectives and approaches given competing claims to knowl-
edge, expertise and power. This avoids being caught in the silo
mentality that sometimes exists in planning theory (Rydin, 2007).
We use a number of methods to show how power plays out in
practice at the community level. For instance, we unpick the
competing social constructions of knowledge of different stake-
holders in the development using ‘sociologic’ diagrams (Latour,
1987). These sociologics vividly illustrate how actors relate to one
another in networks. This is in terms of the knowledge and
resources that actors marshal when seeking to win an argument
over whether a proposed energy-from-waste (EfW) plant should
be built and how it should be operated. In our case study,
participatory efforts failed dramatically because of the high levels
of public distrust in governance institutions. The power that was
projected into this particular community, via an unwanted
development, meant that resistance was inevitable. The commu-
nity responded in three ways: ﬁrst, some ‘citizen scientists’ (cf.
Irwin & Wynne, 1996) tried to tackle the development on its own
terms; second, some community members pursed direct action;
and third, others stood by. In amongst these competing
perspectives of disparate interest groups, planners needed to be
reﬂexive about their own role in terms of power relations and how
they themselves are a key structure projecting power into the
community.
This paper is organised into a further ﬁve sections. In Section 2,
we outline progressive shifts in paradigmatic thinking on public
participation in planning in a thematic review of a directed
selection of the literature. We cover three linked areas: evidence
and analysis of social critiques, case study examples of social and
environmental injustice, and normative suggestions for boosting
public participation. Our conclusion from this thematic review is
that existing theoretical approaches, which inform current
planning practice, remain conﬂicted and require professional
planners to retain a keen critical detachment about the ways they
frame their activities (Pløger, 2001, 2004). This review informs our
approach to the following sections.
In Section 3, we explain our case study methodology and
analytical framework. We make use of sociologics to draw out the
perceptions of key actors from Crymlyn Burrows in south-west
Wales and the power resources that they draw upon. These map
individual actors’ knowledge construction and reveal the array of
knowledge, procedures and norms that a particular network draws
on in its efforts to overcome a rival network. The contestation was
about the framing of risk from a contentious technology – the
incineration of mixed waste – since the perception of risk shaped
how actors and networks behaved. For example, by imposing a low
risk framing on the local community, the developer and regulator
worked within narratives that promoted the beneﬁts of EfW and
drew upon well-established regulatory processes to legitimise
their case. Finally, in this section, we use social network analysis
(SNA) with twelve years’ of meeting data from the community
Liaison Committee of this energy-from-waste (EfW) development.
The SNA further illustrates how events and actors interacted. It
strengthens our analysis of how power is made and remade at the
local level.
In Section 4, we describe the background history of the case
study. Crymlyn Burrows is in the borough of Neath-Port Talbot in
south-west Wales, in an area which has suffered a long history of
environmental degradation. This history is directly linked to a
sense of deep mistrust of public bodies by community members
and this shaped the community response to incineration
technology. The facility, the Materials Recovery and Energy Centre
(MREC), was announced in 1998. Debate, albeit much more muted,
continues in the present well after the facility was licensed in
2002. A distinctly asymmetric set of power relations between three
networks – the regulator, the developers, and community and NGO
dissenters – undermined opportunities for more constructive
stakeholder dialogue in the planning process. In our interviews,
these lost opportunities were reﬂected upon. NGO and community
members pursued a rejectionist strategy based on the precaution-
ary principle. They challenged the scientiﬁc basis for the
developers’ claims for the safety of the incineration process as
citizen scientists (Brown, 1992; Elam & Bertilsson, 2003; Elliott,
Harrop, & Williams, 2009; Irwin & Wynne, 1996). Others in the
community, however, opted for direct action against the project.
Ultimately, Section 4 sets the scene for the reporting on our case
study ﬁndings which are presented in Section 5.
The material in Section 5 reveals the actors’ constructed
knowledge (shown via the sociologics). Interviews were part of a
systematic data collection process that took place in 2009 and then
again in late 2012. Since then we have remained in touch with key
individual actors on a more ad hoc basis. The 2009 material focuses
largely on events between 1998 and 2002 when the EfWs
operating licence was granted. It offers a vivid illustration of the
detailed technical sophistication of the opponents to the EfW plant.
It also shows how quickly the debate on the merits and weaknesses
of the EfW plant moved within and between the polarised
networks. Data is then presented from a second round of
interviews with the same group in 2012. This material concen-
trates more on activity at the site since 2002. There was a serious
ﬁre in 2003 which temporarily shut the plant and forced co-
developer HLC out of the project. The MREC has been shut down
twice more – in 2010 and 2012 – for breaches of its operating
licence over dioxin emissions. Between 2002 and 2012, the
sociologics reveal how constructions of knowledge and network
allegiances have been resilient over time. What shifts most
signiﬁcantly from the licensing phase, up to 2002, to the
operational phase is the emergence of a Liaison Committee. The
activities of this potential ‘hybrid forum’ (cf. Callon, Lascoumes, &
Barthe, 2009), where expertise could be put aside and open
dialogue take place, are illustrated through the application of SNA.
In the end, power played out very differently in practice in the
relationships between Liaison Committee members. For several
years, the committee was the focus of ongoing debate over the
provision of and access to reliable emissions data, but by
2011 many of the original core community dissenters began
dropping away. The core community dissenters argue that the
committee is not a true hybrid forum after more than a decade
with no resolution on key contested issues. In 2012, dissenters
concluded that, for them, the level of engagement on offer only
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represented a degree of tokenism (cf. Arnstein, 1969). In keeping
with the speciﬁc history of the local community, opportunities for
trust and public participation had once again been lost.
Finally, Section 6 draws together the analysis for this case study.
It reviews the implications of our ﬁndings for planning theorists
and practitioners. Having charted the fates of these three networks
over time, we note the strong potential for countervailing political
responses particularly in places where environmental injustice is
believed to have occurred (Pulido, 1994, 1996). These responses
were translated into challenges based on citizen science and/or
attempts at more revolutionary, ‘rhizomic’ responses that entirely
reject the conﬁnes of the planning system (Deleuze & Guattari,
1987), which also took place at Crymlyn Burrows. This detailed
case study suggests a method for planners to reﬂect on the
competing logics of stakeholders in a development (cf. Rydin,
2007). It is an approach that is more in-depth and potentially more
fruitful than ‘locally unwanted land uses’ (LULUs) and ‘not in my
back yard’ (NIMBY) (cf. Bickerstaff, 2012; Devine-Wright, 2011;
Simmons & Walker, 2005). The frictions between perspectives –
e.g. between a realist, governmentality-led approach to planning
(cf. Mckee, 2009) and countervailing, ‘revolutionary’ demands to
disrupt that process – will continue to be in evidence. This is
especially the case in spaces of ‘trust-deﬁcit’. If local government
attempts to introduce technologies perceived to be environmen-
tally degrading, as can be the case of waste management, they will
not be welcomed. In these circumstances, and often over long
periods of time well after a planning decision has been taken or
waste licence has been awarded, planning practitioners must
continue weighing up whether efforts at boosting public partici-
pation in the planning system are realistic, achievable and
necessary. We argue that an improved conceptual framework is
needed for understanding whether or not this is the case (Rittel,
1972; Rittel & Webber, 1973).
2. Power, planning and participation
This section involves a thematic examination of a directed
selection of literature across several planning discourses: Marxist,
advocacy, radical/transactive, collaborative, Foucauldian and
Deleuzian. This in terms of: (i) how proponents conceive of power
relations, (ii) which case study examples they cite relating to social
and environmental injustice, and (iii) what normative changes are
advocated in terms of public participation. We then examine the
planning literature for what such insights mean in terms of
reﬂexive planning practice. The literature recognises the value of
local-level analysis as a window on power relations (Flyvbjerg,
2006) as well as the enduring appeal of debates on planning and
power. Insights from the literature then inform our conceptual
framework and the selection of the EfW plant as a case study. The
literature is generally weak, however, in analyses of power.
Signiﬁcantly, local planning studies fail to grasp the value of a
‘‘more contingent, spatially relational account of how power works
in practice’’ (Grifﬁn, 2012, 209). We rectify this in our case study
(see Section 5) where relationships, interactions and events are
brought to the fore.
2.1. Perspectives on planning and power
We regard national planning systems as an arena of political
negotiation in which land-use decisions are made. The planning
system represents ‘‘important institutional terrain for the contes-
tation of the meaning and relations of the ‘natural environment’’’
(Whatmore & Boucher, 1993, 168). The planning system also
provides broad boundaries to planning activity. As such, the
planning system regulates and guides planning practice. Fried-
mann and Hudson (1974, 2) refer to practice as an activity
‘‘centrally concerned with the linkage between knowledge and
organized action’’ (italics in original). It is what Forester (1999, 177)
more broadly deﬁnes as the ‘‘organization of hope’’. Planning
practice thus identiﬁes the locus, or loci, of political power.
According to Forester (1999), this knowledge helps identify
resource availability. Planning policy exists alongside the planning
system. It represents the codiﬁcation of the intentions of the
planning system in terms of rules, regulations and guidance (cf.
Owens, 1994). Planning theory has always been more problematic
to deﬁne (cf. Friedmann, 1998). However, Allmendinger (2009, 2)
suggests that:
‘‘[T]here are theories of planning (why it exists and what it does)
and theories in planning (how to go about it) . . . theory in the
social sciences is not immune from the inﬂuence of power and
its wider social context, that is, there is a political and temporal
element to theories.’’ (italics in original)
In our case study, a dissenter network assembled to defend
their community. The network provided a means to challenge the
assumptions and practices of EfW plant developers and the
regulator. It drew on its own resources, raised its legitimacy within
the community, its ability to nurture an alternative scientiﬁc
expertise, and developed an alternative narrative challenging
safety at the plant. Throughout the application and licensing
process, and the subsequent operation of the plant, some outcomes
were more heavily favoured than others (e.g. the approval of the
developer application). Nevertheless, the dissenter network
always challenged these assumptions. The playing out of inter-
actions between the more and the less powerful in this case study
demonstrates the ways that people and places are connected and
how power is mediated in practice (cf. Allen, 2004). These issues, as
we shall see below, have been discussed in the planning literature
at length but are still not satisfactorily resolved.
2.2. Planning theory and practice
In this section, we introduce our review of a directed selection
of the planning literature (see Table 1). We characterise how a
pluralistic range of approaches emerged in the 1960s in response
to the perceived deﬁcits of synoptic planning. Given that this
process continues today, this review will be returned to
throughout our analysis.
‘Blueprint planning’, and later ‘synoptic planning’ with its
intellectual underpinning in structural-functionalism, have their
roots associated with the Modernist project. Proponents attempt to
reach ﬁxed objectives with certainty (Faludi, 1971). Involving
relatively untrammelled state power, there is no need for the
public’s input (this only occurs via the ballot box or dissent). Two
key notions survived the early 1960s’ demise of blueprint
planning: (i) planning is essentially apolitical, and, (ii) there is a
single, uniﬁed public interest. As Alexander (2002) indicates,
contemporary notions of the public interest are contested between
different philosophical perspectives, e.g. utilitarianism, communi-
tarianism and libertarianism, for example. Here, we recognise that
contested approaches to the public interest have informed a range
of critiques of synoptic planning as well as other planning
discourses.
Synoptic planning appeared in the early 1960s. It remains the
dominant approach of practitioners in North America and Western
Europe. With its sequential and systematic approach, only limited
public participation is permitted. Synoptic planning was immedi-
ately critiqued for its lack of appreciation of power relations.
Theory and practice were said to be deeply mismatched as
evidenced by empirical studies from the US and the UK. Hoped-for
social outcomes on the ground were typically missed, it was
claimed, in part because of low levels of public participation
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(cf. Ambrose & Colenutt, 1973; Elkin, 1974; Hall & Peacock, 1973;
Meyerson & Banﬁeld, 1955).
A variety of new planning discourses began to emerge. The
practising planner, it was argued, no longer had an apolitical role.
There was no uniﬁed public interest. Advocates of these new
approaches provided case studies illustrating the negative out-
comes of asymmetric power relations (e.g. Altshuler, 1965; Harvey,
1973; Davidoff, 1965). Since the 1980s, similar examples have
been framed in terms of environmental justice (Pulido, 1994).
These proponents of participation similarly offer normative
suggestions for improving planning practice. Boosting public
participation, they suggest, will inevitably help with intractable
wicked problems over land use conﬂicts (Arnstein, 1969; cf.
Mcdonald, 1989; Rittel, 1972). This selection of literature is
examined thematically below.
2.3. Power relations in planning
A number of post-Modern and post-structural planning
discourses emerged in the 1960s. These were used initially to
critique synoptic planning’s approach to theory and practice, but
later they critiqued each other. For each perspective described
below, Table 1 has three rows that are linked in terms of their
argument, the evidence that they bring to bear and analytical
implications:
(i) literature containing the critique of planning and power
relations,
(ii) case studies revealing social/environmental injustice as
evidence of (i), and
(iii) normative approaches to public participation as a ‘solution’ to
(i) and (ii).
Of the perspectives running from left to right in Table 1,
Marxists were the ﬁrst to critique structural-functionalism
(e.g. Dahrendorf, 1959; Mills, 1956; Rex, 1961/2010). Marxism’s
revolutionary prescriptions share much with the more recent
perspective of Deleuzian planning (Purcell, 2013). All perspec-
tives shown in Table 1 place emphasis on power relations.
All except collaborative planning avoid the presumption that
actors in any planning system automatically desire social co-
operation. Of necessity, no review can be comprehensive when
there are such longstanding and wide-ranging debates in
planning theory. Our concern has been to focus on those
contributions where there is a more overt recognition of power
relations.
2.3.1. Marxist approaches to planning and power
As the literature cited in the top row of Table 1 indicates,
Marxist planning has an overt recognition of power relations based
on a class-based critique. Co-opted individuals and institutions
enact the centralised policy choices of others (cf. Kravitz, 1970;
Simmie, 1974). These same actors are unreﬂective about their roles
within local, regional and national power structures (Simmie,
1974). The planning system is an arena subject to overt political
power. Pahl (1970, 191), for example, points out that:
‘‘The built environment is the result of conﬂicts, in the past and
present, between those with different degrees of power in
society – landowners, planners, developers, estate agents, local
authorities . . . [and] . . . The social structure is the key to the
spatial structure.’’
The state has a critical yet deceptive role:
‘‘[P]lanning potentially seeks to help sustain capital and even
persuade people that it is acting on their behalf (through publicTa
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participation, etc.) while in reality it is really a fac¸ade for
powerful interests.’’ (Allmendinger, 2009, 85).
Case studies of power relations – shown in the second row of
Table 1 – reveal socially iniquitous outcomes for individuals and
communities (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1972, 1974; Harvey, 1973).
By the early 1980s and into the 1990s, this literature overlapped
with that of the nascent environmental justice movement. Case
studies came from the United States, for example (e.g. Bryant &
Mohai, 1992; Bullard, 1983, 1990, 1994; Geiser & Waneck, 1983).
Empirical work linking power and race, although not always
deﬁnitive (see Cutter, 1995), nevertheless provoking some
planning practitioners to tackle power, racism and poverty in
ways not being undertaken in the UK (e.g. Agyeman, Bullard, &
Evans, 2003; Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Walker, 1998; Walker &
Bickerstaff, 2000; Walker, Fairburn, & Bickerstaff, 2001).
In the UK, Marxist studies reveal signiﬁcant disparities of
wealth throughout the UK driven in large part by unequal patterns
of land ownership (e.g. Massey & Catalano, 1978). Similarly, David
Harvey explores the social processes at work in the urban
regeneration of East Baltimore at the city and neighbourhood
level (Harvey, 1973, 2000). He notes:
‘‘[L]ow-income groups experienced great difﬁculty in actually
getting into a negotiating position . . . groups can effectively be
excluded from the negotiating and bargaining game by
institutional barriers or by manoeuvres of other groups. Only
a strong and cohesive group will be able to overcome such
barriers and get around the problem of what is called ‘non-
decision-making.’’’ (Harvey, 2010, 78)
In this way, Harvey highlights one way that power relations are
exercised at the micro-level. He suggests that those individuals and
institutions with the power to include or exclude others from a
network or forum will impact upon the ways that social justice
plays out (Harvey, 2010). This is another important insight into the
social processes underpinning our longitudinal case study which
reveals efforts by more powerful actors to both include and
exclude certain individuals and interest groups from the develop-
ment process.
The Marxist critique of synoptic planning, however, does not
promote public participation:
‘‘[N]o scope for public participation . . . no role was provided for
the public . . . the approach had little to offer the practising
planner . . . while the Marxists advocated grass-roots action,
they offered no suggestions for coping with the dominance of
the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have nots’ in planning’’ (Lane, 2005,
294)
Two other approaches – advocacy planning and radical/
transactive planning – also tackle the need to overtly recognise
power relations. These are explored below.
2.3.2. Advocacy planning and power
Advocacy planning recognises the uneven bargaining power of
different groups and their varied access to power structures. Lane
(2005, 293) summarises its central tenets:
(i) there is a profound inequality of bargaining power between
groups,
(ii) there is unequal access to the political structure, and
(iii) there are large numbers of people who are unorganised and
therefore unrepresented by interest groups.
The idea of a unitary public interest is rejected. Instead, as many
marginal voices as possible are included. From this, advocacy
planners are regarded as facilitators who encourage marginal
actors to participate in the planning process or advocate on their
behalf. Taking their cue from the manifesto of Davidoff (1965),
advocacy planners looked to the slums of Boston and the
redevelopment of the cities around San Francisco, where effective
political representation for residents of ethnically diverse and
impoverished communities was rare (Peattie, 1968; Kaplan, 1969).
In terms of advocacy planning’s normative vision, public partici-
pation became a central objective, not a technique to be added
later. For example, as Table 1 indicates, Arnstein (1969) notes
positive outcomes from increased participation for individuals
involved in US Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) schemes. Such outcomes suggested power could be shared
by improvements in process and participation. However, the
relative power of protagonists still remains asymmetrically
distributed in space.
2.3.3. Radical/transactive planning and power
Radical/transactive planning is based on an overt recognition of
inequalities of access to power (Friedmann, 1973, 1987, 2008;
Grabow & Heskin, 1973; Kravitz, 1970). Community involvement
in a decentralised planning system is sought because of inequal-
ities within and between communities and other interest groups
(Friedmann, 1973, 1987). Face-to-face, interpersonal dialogue is
pursued. Outcomes are evaluated in terms of mutual learning and
linking knowledge to action (cf. Grabow & Heskin, 1973). Plans
should have an ‘‘effect on people-on their dignity and sense of
effectiveness, their values and behavior, their capacity for growth
through cooperation, their spirit of generosity’’ (Hudson, Galloway,
& Kaufman, 1979, 389, italics in original). Social outcomes are
considered more important than economic beneﬁts.
Table 1 shows that early radical researchers in the UK drew on
case studies including the UK commercial ofﬁce building market
(Ambrose & Colenutt, 1973), new developments in the village of
Ringmer in East Sussex (Ambrose, 1974) and in Southwark in South
London (Ambrose & Colenutt, 1973). Ambrose (1974, 220) found
social and environmental injustice stemming directly from
developers’ market actions:
‘‘[S]omething is terribly wrong when developers . . . can proﬁt
from millions of square feet of empty ofﬁce space in London
when countless men, women and children are homeless. So
long as abuses such as these are possible, the quiet revolution is
not yet complete.’’
The radical vision is for ‘‘participation and empowerment . . .
[to] become goals to be attained rather than methods to be used’’
(Lane, 2005, 293). Radical dissenting strategies amongst commu-
nities (e.g. Beard, 2003) have achieved positive goals. Such strategy
formation has direct relevance to our case study in terms of
individuals attempting to overcome dominant neo-liberal gover-
nance arrangements.
2.3.4. Collaborative planning
Collaborative planning is a re-afﬁrmation from the political left
of a Modernist, structural-functionalist approach to planning
theory (Forester, 1989, 1999; Healey, 1992, 1997, 1998c; Innes,
1995). Collaborative planning’s normative approach to conﬂict
resolution emerged in the 1980s in recognition of the struggle with
wicked problems. Drawing on Habermas (1968a, 1968b, 1981),
power relations are recognised (e.g. Healey, 1973; Healey,
Underwood, Mcloughlin, & Diamond, 1978), but generally de-
emphasized.
Collaborative planning involves individuals moving: ‘‘towards
inter-subjective mutual understanding’’ (Healey, 1992, 147–150)
which will facilitate participation, interaction, reﬂection and social
justice. From this, Healey (1998a, 1535) suggests that there will be
the development of governance cultures in which:
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‘‘collaborative collective action is possible [and] will be more
likely to resist forces leading to economic exploitation of people
in places, to limit environmental degradation, and to maximise
the possibilities of human ﬂourishing in sustainable environ-
mental relations than cultures which are dominated by
individualist competitive strategies.’’
Disputed by realist theorists as utopian, collaborative planning
was nevertheless adopted by policymakers in the UK and US in the
late 1990s (DTLR, 2001; Goldstein & Butler, 2010; Margerum,
2002; ODPM, 2002, 2004; Petts, 1995).
2.3.5. Foucauldian planning
Foucauldian planning came in response to the perceived
shortcomings of collaborative planning’s Habermasian under-
pinnings. As described in Section 2.1, Foucauldian planning
involves an assessment of state power via the governmentality
approach (Dean, 1999; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991;
Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992). With governmentality,
power relations are all-pervasive and expressed relationally
between actors (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 1996,
1998; Hillier, 1993; Yiftachel, 1994, 1998).
In terms of deﬁning power, and understanding how power
relations are exercised, Foucault’s deﬁnition, based in part on
Bentham and Marx, has proved popular:
‘‘[T]here exists no single power, but several powers . . .
[including] forms of domination, forms of subjection, which
function locally . . . All these are local, regional forms of power,
which have their own way of functioning, their own procedure
and technique. All these forms of power are heterogeneous. We
cannot therefore speak of power, if we want to do an analysis of
power, but we must speak of powers and try to localize them in
their historical and geographical speciﬁcity’’ (Foucault, 1976,
cited in Crampton and Elden, 2007, 156).
For Foucault, this deﬁnition of what power is was further
elaborated in his concerns for how power is made manifest. First
and foremost, it is relational and performative. Only when it is
exercised does power exist (Marshall, 1995). As Foucault (1982,
219) notes:
‘‘The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between
partners, individuals or collectives; it is a way in which certain
action modiﬁes others . . . Power exists only when it is put into
action’’.
Secondly, Foucault was supremely conscious of how power is
exercised oppressively instead of achieving liberal freedoms
(Foucault, 1975, 1980). As Bevir (1999, 69) points out:
‘‘Our modem society . . . [does not defend] . . . individual liberty
in the way we might think it does. On the contrary . . . liberal
freedom [is] . . . impossible . . . [M]odern reason excludes . . . the
way modern power dominates the individual.’’
Then, as Foucault (1976, 95) indicates: ‘‘Where there is power,
there is resistance.’’
Thirdly, Foucault explored how power is exercised via the state
– through ‘governmentality’ – or what he termed the ‘conduct of
conduct’ (Defert & Ewald, 1994, 237). From these tenets, a
discursive form of governmentality was developed (Dean, 1999).
At its heart, this discursive approach seeks to describe and explain
the demands and social dynamics of governing a modern state,
how power relations are exercised relationally, the resulting
potential for oppression and countervailing geographies of
resistance (Mckee, 2009). Governmentality also analyses how
power creates knowledge, and speciﬁcally how the production of
geographical knowledge can be used to control actors and
institutions in particular territorial spaces (O´ Tuathail, 1996;
Rose-Redwood, 2006). The projection of ‘power at a distance’,
essential for state control of territory, is achieved relationally
through a variety of ‘technologies’ (Barry, 1996) which, to
distinguish them from energy-from-waste technologies, we refer
to as ‘procedures’. One set of procedures is via the planning system
which can involve basic accounting systems and statistics, spatial
plans, communications media, and development plans, for
example. Along with human agency, these procedures help stitch
and maintain governance networks. Relational links align ‘gov-
erned’ actors who are embedded in geographically remote areas
(Mackinnon, 2000; Murdoch, 2004). Faced with wicked policy
problems with divisive outcomes (cf. Alty & Darke, 1987; Davoudi
& Atkinson, 1999; Healey, 1995, 1997), displays of governmental
power in the planning arena result in adaptation (Mackinnon,
2000) or resistance (Raco, 2003).
Governmentality also provides a framework for understanding
the indirect ways in which power structures individuals’ behaviour
in other ways (Allen, 2004). Stakeholders behave responsibly
because they understand what acceptable behaviour is and what
they imagine to be the reality of their own circumstances (Grifﬁn,
2012). Allen (2004, 23) suggests that for ‘‘embedded institutional
practices’’, governmentality is a plausible explanation for con-
strained agency. For instance, regulatory ‘intrusion’ into local spaces
shapes the distinct responses that communities are permitted to
pursue. However, the regulator in our case study failed to recognise
the deep-rooted historical speciﬁcities of this community.
In succinct criticism of the governmentality approach, Grifﬁn
(2012) makes two pertinent points. First, governmentality gives
insufﬁcient attention to resource inequalities. As we shall see,
regulatory and developer networks for the EfW were able to draw
upon much greater resources than dissenters in exercising power.
Second, it underplays individual agency. Governmentality suggests
actors have to react to dominant discourses, such as those for the
regulation of polluting industries (cf. Mckee, 2009). In our case
study location, though, the dissenter network, although often
working within regulatory procedures and norms, were able to
develop an alternative discourse. This gave priority to their
interpretation of the precautionary principle and how pollution
might be measured independently.
Table 1 shows that the key Foucauldian case study is the in-
depth examination of the redevelopment of central Aalborg in
Denmark in the 1970s (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The civic contestation
here involved:
‘‘[P]ower relations . . . [that] were of a pre-modern kind that could
not be defended publicly vis-a`-vis standards of modern
democracy . . . I found too little democracy.’’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002,
8–9)
This is relevant to our case study because local authorities with
vested interests in development plans will inevitably consider
excluding certain voices from planning debates. In this way,
‘‘[P]lanning and public participation are always permeated not
only by power, but also by tactics, strategies, and the microphysics
of power.’’ (Pløger, 2001, 228).
2.3.6. Deleuzian planning
More recently, ‘Deleuzian planning’, or ‘Deleuzoguattarian’
planning, another Marxist approach, has been explored (Gunder,
2010; Hillier, 2005, 2007, 2008; Purcell, 2013). Concerned with
transition and ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’, Deleuze and Guattari
worry about ‘‘how capitalism and the state function as apparatuses
of capture’’ (Purcell, 2013, 30). They suggest unfettered capitalism
creates instability and upheaval while the state tries to manage
economic production. The state must impose its will on institu-
tions and individuals, via a ‘‘whole apparatus of regulation’’ to
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govern economic relations (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze,
Guattari, & Massumi, 1977, 252).
Normative approaches to public participation are challenged
via Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘revolutionary connections’’ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, 473). They advocate freeing individuals from state-
controlled ‘‘striated space’’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 474–500)
via dissent which may occur in cross-cutting, bottom-up fora
termed ‘‘rhizomes’’ where space is non-metric and accentred
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 17). Rhizomes are a ‘‘non-hierarchical,
non-signifying system without a General and without an organis-
ing memory or central automaton, deﬁned solely by a circulation of
states’’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 21). Rhizomes self-organise in a
challenge to the state’s top-down projection of power and,
according to (Coyne, 2008, 558), they are ‘‘parasitic on established
structures [growing] from within to subvert the ediﬁce.’’ Rhizomes
are ‘‘entities in which each member has the potential to
communicate horizontally with any other’’ (Purcell, 2013, 27).
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that all forms of dissent cannot be
said to be automatically equated with rhizomic activity.
Table 1 reveals examples of Deleuzian planning in the literature
including Melbourne (Dovey, 2005; Dovey, Woodcock, & Wood,
2009), Kosovo (Hillier, 2007), and Tromsø in Norway (Nyseth,
Pløger, & Holm, 2010). As Purcell (2013, 22, 31) notes of Deleuze
and Guattari:
‘‘[They] . . . offer us . . . an unapologetically normative political
agenda. . . [and it is] an unmistakable rejection of any form of
state-led planning . . . from rational, expert-driven planning to
more participatory and communicative forms.’’
We return to such insights in our case study as it suggests that
highly disaffected individuals and communities, who place no trust
in the mechanisms of the state, will self-organise and may not
engage at all with organised efforts at boosting public participation
in the planning process (cf. Walker, 2012).
2.3.7. Conclusions and implications of the literature review
Overall, this review of the literature suggests to us that there are
a number of important insights into the social processes
underpinning power and participation in national planning
systems. The Marxist critique of synoptic planning is strong, but
does not promote public participation. Advocacy planning, radical/
transactive planning, collaborative planning and Deleuzian plan-
ning similarly recognise the uneven power relations of different
groups. These approaches suggest improvements in process and
participation based on their normative critique of synoptic
planning. However, while the Foucauldian approach does not
offer a normative critique of power asymmetries, it has been used
in in-depth case studies to reveal such iniquities over time and in
space (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Meanwhile, Deleuzian planning does offer
an analysis of such dissent in state-controlled striated spaces (and/
or more radical rhizomes) and these two approaches are relevant
for the interpretation of our case study in Section 5.
We recognise that discursive governmentality has its limita-
tions including failing to sufﬁciently recognise the scope for action
of individual actors (cf. Grifﬁn, 2012; Mckee, 2009). Nevertheless
we believe that the Foucauldian perspective offers the most
potential for the analysis of the way power plays out at the local
level which is the focus of our case study. To overcome this
weakness in scope, we pursue ‘realist governmentality’ in our
analysis (Stenson, 2005, 2008). This modiﬁed approach to
discursive governmentality avoids the pitfall of assuming that
governmental ambitions are always successful in realizing their
desired outcomes (Mckee, 2009). Instead, a realist governmental-
ity is based upon politics and social relations which stress local
variation and context. In this way, realist governmentality retains
the key analytical insights of discursive governmentality but also
offers ‘‘an analysis of the exercise of power in situ that is sensitive
to both time and place’’ (Mckee, 2009, 482). This approach reveals
the ‘‘messiness and complexity involved in the struggles around
subjectivity, and [offers] a more nuanced and ﬁnely grained
analysis of governing in situ’’ (Mckee, 2009, 479). In her case study
research on public participation in housing management in the UK,
McKee has found that when opportunities for participation are
offered by political authorities, they nevertheless remain in control
of both the policy agendas and signiﬁcant ﬁnancial resource:
‘‘[C]ommunity participation [occurs] in strictly deﬁned param-
eters. This is more akin to a process of incorporation than
empowerment, and results in strategic-level decisions being
retained within the state apparatus . . . This opens up the
possibility of contestation and contradiction between, and
within, governmental rationalities as interpreted by different
actors’’ (Mckee, 2009, 474–6).
Having described the concept of power that we pursue in this
study, the next section details how this approach is going to be
used.
3. Methodology
Using a mixed method approach, we draw out the dynamic
nature of power relations in our case study, i.e. how they are
contested, constructed and reconstructed. Our design draws on
qualitative interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of
quantitative data from primary and secondary sources to identify
which social processes underpinned key interactions. A longitu-
dinal analytical framework is used to capture: (a) the nature of
individuals’ opposing constructions of knowledge over time of the
Materials Recovery and Energy Centre (MREC) in Crymlyn
Burrows, and (b) how power relations between three networks
play out in space and time. By studying the MREC’s development
proposal, its approval and operation over nearly 15 years, we
characterise the nature of this contestation over a long time frame
not normally seen with studies focusing solely on events leading to
the award of an operating licence. The location of the site of the
MREC development is shown in Fig. 1.
Qualitative longitudinal research from interviews is analysed
diachronically, through time, and synchronically by cross-cutting
at one point in time (Corden & Millar, 2007; Elliott, Holland, &
Thomson, 2008; Shirani & Henwood, 2011). We examined
interviewee data from both perspectives. We attended to different
types of social structures/systems in analysis and interpretation –
i.e. longitudinal intersectionality – by dividing our interviewees
into three networks each with distinct roles in this contestation
over the EfW plant. We analysed how their responses overlapped
or remained mutually exclusive in terms of their constructions of
knowledge.
3.1. Data collection – Materials Recovery and Energy Centre (MREC)
In terms of secondary data sources, a media search was
conducted in the LexisNexis database. All articles relating to the
MREC development from 1998 to 2012 in regional and national
newspapers were collated. From this, a timeline of events was
created referencing all actors including community members,
community leaders/representatives, planners, developer/opera-
tors, consultants, statutory consultees, the regulator and local
politicians.
Then, potential contributors were identiﬁed in terms of their
likely perceptions of the health risks of incineration – from low-
risk to high-risk – as well as the likely reﬂexivity they might exhibit
with those in other networks. These potential contributors were
then approached by letter, telephone and e-mail. Initially
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individuals were classiﬁed as to whether they were supportive of
the proposed development (e.g. developer), neutral (e.g. regulator)
or antagonistic (e.g. community). Once key contributors from these
three groupings had been approached they were also asked to
suggest the names of further people who should be interviewed for
their knowledge of the development.
In 2009, eight in-depth qualitative interviews were recorded at
contributors’ homes, their places of work or at neutral public
venues. Typically these interviews lasted 2 hours. Phone inter-
views with the same contributors for 30–40 minutes were
undertaken in 2012, except for E1 who refused. However, written
answers to our questions for E1 were given by their employer,
Environment Agency Wales (EAW). All recordings were tran-
scribed and coded in an iterative way using an analytical inductive
approach (cf. Thomas, 2006). Anonymised codenames and network
names for these stakeholders in the MREC development are given
in Fig. 2. The governmentality dimension at the top of Fig. 2
suggests a tripartite split between: (i) ‘governing groups’ on the left
who reside in more politically networked areas; (ii) ‘instrumental
groups’ in the middle who assist governing groups in achieving
their aims, and (iii) ‘governed groups’ on the right who are
relationally less networked, and so more ‘distant’ from governing
groups than instrumental groups.
Fig. 2 shows that these groups, categorised primarily in terms of
governance (Bulkeley, Watson, Hudson, & Weaver, 2005), were
then also characterised according to their anticipated environ-
mental risk perceptions. These run from ‘very low risk’ on the left,
i.e. that of the typically more technocratic types, to ‘very high risk’
on the right, i.e. that of those with high environmental concerns
due to their physical proximity to the MREC development. Fig. 2
shows that the breakdown of contributions in terms of networks
was as follows:
(i) the regulatory network (E1),
(ii) the developer network (C1 and D1), and
(iii) the dissenter network (A1, A2, B1, B3, and B4).
Governmentality Dimens ion
politically ‘central’ regiona l agents regiona l agents politically ‘distant ’ political ‘distant ’
Environmental Risk Perception Dim ens ion
very low risk group low risk group medium risk group high risk group very high r isk group
national & devol ved 
gover nment  politicia ns / 
regu latory agen cies / civil 
serv ants
developers / operators, 
planners, co nsultants, 
planning commi ttee 
members
local politici ans, statut ory 
consult ees
community leaders, c hurc h 
figures
community memb ers, NGO 
members, members o f the 
media
REGUL ATORY NE TWORK
E1 – En vironmen t Age ncy 
Wales (E AW)
DEVELOP ER NETWORK
C1 – Lead Co-develop er /
Planner (Neath  Port Talbo t 
Count y Borough Council)
D1 – Co-develop er / 
Operator (HLC Neath-Port 
Talbot Ltd)
DISSENTER  NET WORK
A1 & A2 – Pressure  Grou p 
1 (PG 1)
B1 & B2 – Environm ental 
non-governmental 
organisa tion  1 (NGO 1)
B4 - En vir onmental  non-
gover nmenta l orga nisati on 
2 (NGO 2)
Fig. 2. Networks and actors in terms of a typology of governmentality and environmental risk perception.
Fig. 1. Map of Materials Recovery and Energy Centre (MREC) facility, Crymlyn Burrows, Neath Port Talbot, South Wales.
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When ﬁrst approached, members of the regulatory network,
EAW indicated that their views were largely uniform. Only one
contributor would be made available due to the fact that the case
study had been so controversial for EAW. The regulatory network
also had no signiﬁcant concerns about the proposed development
and so, with its technocratic approach, could be considered to be
operating within similar framings of risk to the developer network.
Conversely, the opinions expressed in press articles by the
dissenters are relatively heterogeneous. There was, however, a
strategic split between those pursuing direct action and those
tackling the MREC development on its scientiﬁc and technological
merits alone Fig. 2 shows that, no contributors appeared in press
cuttings who represented views from in between the very
polarised perspectives of those in the three leading networks.
Our contributor search was therefore mediated by our press article
search. Nevertheless, while the media had a role in amplifying (and
de-amplifying) such political divisions (cf. Kasperson et al., 1988),
there is little doubt from the media coverage, NGO documents and
our interviews that the issues described in the case study below
were indeed fought over ﬁercely on all sides.
Ultimately, our theoretical framework and the data collected
are linked via analysis undertaken for each network which focuses
on the evidence for governmentality. This initially involved
producing sociologics described in the next section.
3.2. Sociologics
Latour (1987, 205–213) calls maps of knowledge constructions
‘sociologics’ and indicates that there is no privileged way of
viewing them:
‘‘None of these people think either logically or illogically, but
always sociologically . . . they look for stronger and more
resistant allies . . . Thus mapping . . . [reveals] what they value
most . . . Irrationality is always an accusation made by someone
building a network over someone else who stands in the way . . .
[W]ords like ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ . . . are meaningless . . .
[sociologics] simply consider the angle, direction, movement
and scale of the observer’s displacement.’’
Sociologics, constructed for members of each network, help us
to answer questions about the inevitability of conﬂict (cf. Damer &
Hague, 1971). As shown generically in Fig. 3, these diagrams
highlight similarities and differences between the constructions of
knowledge of individuals. In interview, contributors made a
number of stated beliefs. They offered a range of ‘evidence’ in
support of those beliefs. Highlighting these ‘logical’ connections in
a chain of beliefs constructed from different positions of power,
however seemingly ‘illogical’ to an outsider, paints a richer and
more textured picture of the contrasting risk perceptions and other
framings. Sociologics therefore help to visually reveal how
knowledge constructions are made manifest (Latour, 1987). They
show how network members access different resources and why
power is likely to play out differently between networks in various
ways. This approach, particularly given our repeat interviews over
time, provides a more nuanced and dynamic analysis of power,
knowledge and local environmental decision-making. The social
network analysis, outlined in the next section, reveals the potential
for the ﬂow of power rather than automatically showing the
exercise of power in a network (Rydin, 2013).
3.3. Power relations and social network analysis
One approach to social network analysis is afﬁliation networks
in which two-mode analysis involves logging actors’ names against
their attendance at meetings, for example. In afﬁliation networks,
the centrality of all actors is a key indicator of relative networked
power (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Centrality
reveals those actors and events which have the densest afﬁliations
with other actors and events (Faust, 1997). Afﬁliation network
analysis thus visualises how actors and events are interrelated. An
afﬁliation network has two types of nodes: a set of actors and a set
of events (plus a set of relations between each nodal type).
Research on two-mode networks can discover the relational
structures among actors, through their joint involvement in events,
and reveal the relational structure of events attracting common
participants. By contrast, one-mode networks link actors to actors
or events to events. We use Ucinet 6 to undertake two-mode graph
construction and to make calculations of centrality. The latter
includes measures of closeness (Freeman) and proximal between-
ness. In terms revealing the potential importance of actors within
the overall network, we also use a one-mode eigenvector analysis.
We gathered lists of attendees at Liaison Committee meetings
between 2001 and 2013. This data was acquired from community
members after no response was received from a request to
NPTCBC. These Liaison Committee meetings are important. They
provide an insight into how key network actors perceived power
Fig. 3. Generic construction of a sociologic diagram.
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operating in the community. How certain actors sought to exercise
this power is explored in more detail in Section 5.4. The Liaison
Committee meetings covered 56 meetings in total and were
attended by 65 different individuals at different times. This list of
meetings is not a complete record, but it is believed to be very
close, and are the ofﬁcially recorded minutes of these Liaison
Committee meetings. The data is largely representative of the
trends in the Committee’s changing composition. Meeting data
was entered into a spreadsheet where rows represent participants
and columns are speciﬁc meetings. From this, a binary afﬁliation
network was represented by an afﬁliation matrix that records the
presence or absence of g actors at h events. The dimensions of the
matrix are g rows and h columns. If actor i attends event j, for
example, the entry in the i,jth cell of the matrix equals
1. Otherwise the entry is 0. When this data was placed into the
SNA software, Ucinet 6, it revealed a two-mode visual represen-
tation of the links between the 65 actors and the 56 meetings
which took place over twelve years. The relative strength of
linkages amongst actors and their relative involvement in the
meetings over time was revealed in a table showing measures of
centrality along with a graph showing that centrality in terms of
visual proximity between actors and meetings (cf. Faust, 1997;
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Ucinet 6 was also used to produce a
one-mode eigenvector analysis in tabular and graphical form for
the structure of actors’ links to other actors. This analysis involved
assessing the co-occurrence of neighbouring data through the
summing of cross-products. Where the sum of cross-products is
high, high relative power of networked relations between actors
can be inferred.
4. Case study – Crymlyn Burrows, Neath Port Talbot
In this section, we describe the detailed history of the
community in which local perceptions of pollution were integral
to shaping the opposition to the EfW proposal events. This place-
speciﬁc history is linked to a number of reasons why the
community responded so forcibly to the proposed EfW plant from
1998 (cf. Bickerstaff, 2012). We then outline who the key actors are
in the three networks – regulator, developer, and dissenter. In
Section 4.1 we begin to outline the views of key participants and
these identiﬁed by their unique network codes, e.g. ‘D1’ is a
member of the developer network.
In September 1998, a developers’ network, led by two co-
developers, Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council (NPTCBC)
and a Portuguese-owned waste operator HLC (Neath Port Talbot)
Ltd, proposed a £32m waste recovery and incineration develop-
ment, the MREC. It was designed to operate for twenty-ﬁve years.
NPTCBC hoped that this project, funded under the then Labour
government’s private-ﬁnance initiative (PFI), would help meet
impending stiffer EC regulations on sending waste to landﬁll sites.
The MREC project was ﬁnancially attractive to NPTCBC because it
could generate income by processing waste from neighbouring
councils.
The planning laws for England and Wales are regulated locally
by NPTCBC’s planning department. Licensing regulations are
policed by institutions in a regulatory network led by Environment
Agency Wales (EAW) (now part of Natural Resources Wales).
When, in 1998, the decision was made by NPTCBC to locate the
MREC facility near to several communities on the western edge of
Neath Port Talbot, a dissenters’ network formed in response. This
was made up of a wide variety of political, community and
scientiﬁc advocacy groups who contested the development on the
basis of social and environmental injustice, allegedly ﬂawed
engineering practice underpinning incineration, as well as the
ways the process is regulated.
4.1. Pollution sources in the area
Local sensitivities to a potentially new polluting activity like the
MREC were always going to run high (cf. Walker, 2012). Up until
the 1980s, the communities around Crymlyn Burrows had been in
the shadow of heavily polluting industry for decades (Humphrys &
Williams, 2005). In 1935, a 150-megawatt (MW) power station
was built nearby by Swansea Corporation. At the time, ‘Tir John’
was the biggest power station in Britain. It was in operation from
1936 to 1976 burning powdered anthracite duff, a cheap coal
waste product from the pit-heads. This put sulphur dioxide into the
local atmosphere and was a signiﬁcant source of pollution on the
East Side of Swansea and in the smaller settlements on the western
edge of Neath-Port Talbot. However, Tir John power station went
into intermittent operation in 1960 as newer sources of electricity
were appearing (Ryland et al., 2011; Walker, 2007). In 1967, Tir
John was linked to the very large Llandarcy oil reﬁnery nearby and
was converted to oil burning. It was decommissioned in 1976 as a
result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo (SWEP, 2012).
The next most signiﬁcant historic source of pollution on
Swansea’s East Side was Anchor Chemical Ltd.’s notorious United
‘carbon black’ factory. Opened in 1948 in Port Tennant, this non-
unionised, US-owned operation produced ‘Dixie’ and ‘Kosmos’
grade carbon blacks. These act as a pigment and reinforcing phase
in car tyres and other rubber products. It was clear at the time that
short-term exposure to high concentrations of carbon black dust
could mechanically irritate the upper respiratory tract and produce
discomfort. In and around Swansea’s East Side, according to one
contemporary account, the United factory created:
‘‘clouds of black smut and dirt which constantly rain down on
the houses nearby. This makes it impossible for washing to be
hung outside. Within an hour it is ﬁlthy, so all washing has to be
dried indoors. But the dirt also comes indoors, covering food,
furniture, children and babies. A local manager of the factory
once remarked that the people of the area were living in slums
anyway, why were they complaining about dirt?’’ (Bone, 1971)
Similarly, Allen (1971, 34) notes that the ‘‘ﬁlth is appalling’’ and
quotes local residents as saying:
‘‘‘Windows and washing are all marked by the carbon,’’ said one
resident, Mr. Edgar Cutler. ‘If I want a clean shirt my wife has to
take it to the launderette to get it dry . . . My wife and I have
to scrub our carpets once every eight weeks and we have to
redecorate three or four times for every once that other people
have to do it.’ Another resident, Mrs. Jessie Cottle said: ‘I suffer
from asthma and the air is seriously affecting my health. I
cannot even open my bedroom window at night.’’’
Allen (1971) also notes that some Port Tennant mothers
claimed that their children got so dirty that they used detergents
on them. In governance terms, the ‘Alkali Inspectorate’ – the key
pollution regulator at the time – stated repeatedly that the
pollution levels were perfectly legal. However, in recognising that
the situation was clearly iniquitous, the purchase of pollution
monitoring equipment was suggested (Allen, 1971). Protests by
residents to Anchor Chemicals, to the local authority (Swansea), to
local MPs and to the Health Authority went unheeded. This
provoked direct action outside Swansea Council’s Guildhall ofﬁces
by Port Tennant housewives. They dumped their dirty washing on
the Council steps and began a 23-day blockade of the factory. The
dispute was only resolved when Anchor Chemicals agreed to invest
£35,000 (in 1971 prices) in pollution monitoring equipment. A
community liaison committee was also established (Bone, 1971).
These two positive outcomes had direct relevance to the events we
focus on in the late 1990s and 2000s. By the 1980s, the United plant
had changed its name and relocated. The Port Tennant site was
N. Hacking, A. Flynn / Progress in Planning 113 (2017) 1–3710
cleared and turned into a community sports centre. However,
further potential cumulative impacts have also been identiﬁed (cf.
Vanclay & Bronstein, 1995).
Next to the carbon black factory works was a tar distillery. Up
until the 1970s, it produced tar by partial combustion of heavy oil-
based products, now considered potentially carcinogenic in
humans (IARC, 2010). In 1980, Tir John power station was
demolished. Yet the site soon became another source of pollution
when it was designated a landﬁll by the District and City of
Swansea (DCS). Ever since, there have been periodic concerns from
local residents on Swansea’s East Side about asthma, chest
problems, and smells. At the time that the MREC development
in nearby Crymlyn Burrows was announced in 1998, the Tir John
landﬁll was approaching capacity. The operator, by then the City
and County of Swansea (CCS), has since closed and reopened the
landﬁll site due to capacity shortages similar to those in NPTCBC
and elsewhere.
In October, 1996, there was an industrial accident in an
underground pumping station at Crymlyn Burrows sewage pump-
ing station. This resulted in the deaths of two council employees who
were overcome by toxic fumes from Gower Chemicals whilst
underground. Opinion amongst the local community was that
industrial activity was not being regulated enough by Environment
Agency Wales (EAW) to prevent such tragedies (Dix, 1999; Rees,
1998). This was despite successful prosecutions against the dead
workers’ employers, NPTCBC.
Dissenting local residents repeatedly draw upon this rich
localised environmental narrative – which also includes further
negative environmental inputs – in terms of their sense of place
identity (cf. Pulido, 1994; Simmons & Walker, 2005). It is a
narrative that is fuelled by, and further fuels, distrust of local
governmental institutions, chieﬂy the CCS, NPTCBC, and EAW. In
contrast to communities that may acquiesce in the face of such
developments, the residents in and around Crymlyn Burrows
were radicalised by events going back forty years and more
when the new MREC development was proposed in 1998. One
sentiment was repeated in the community repeatedly despite
more recent improvements: residents had historically shoul-
dered much more than their fair share of polluting industry than
other communities had. Such industrial processes, it was said,
would not be tolerated in more afﬂuent areas, like the western
districts of Swansea. Any new industrial processes, especially
polluting ones, would therefore never be welcomed by those
living in Crymlyn Burrows and in Swansea’s East Side (SWEP,
1998a).
The waste planners and councillors in NPTCBC already knew
much of the local context. The co-developer from HLC (Neath Port
Talbot) Ltd. claims their company did not (D1 Interview, 2009). In
the section below, we explore the history of the development
proposal and the reactions that it triggered in 1998.
4.2. History of a waste development
The siting of an energy-from-waste (EfW) facility is a wicked
problem (cf. Rittel & Webber, 1973). First, the siting decision itself
is a symptom of another problem: the need to avoid sending
material to landﬁll. Local authorities in England and Wales, like
NPTCBC, were aware from the mid-1990s that a planned European
Directive (1999/31/EC) would boost recycling by statutorily
reducing the amount of waste allowed to go to landﬁll. To give
meaning to the European legislation, the UK government began
revising its approach to waste management in December 1995. The
government published a White Paper Making Waste Work: A
Strategy for Sustainable Waste Management (DoE, 1995). In 2002,
statute, the Landﬁll, England and Wales, Regulations (OPSI, 2002),
appeared.
One reason for the selection of this case study was that, during
the 1980s and 1990s, Wales had a poor record for the recycling and
recovery of waste. In fact, this particular local authority, NPTCBC,
had the worst record for recycling in Wales in 1998 according to
the Audit Commission (Peregrine, 1999). NPTCBC needed to
signiﬁcantly revise its approach to waste management as a result
of external European policy drivers. These included the Landﬁll
Directive (99/31/EC) (EC, 1999) and the Waste Framework Directive
(75/442/EC) (EC, 1975) which actively discouraged the landﬁlling
of waste and promoted recycling and recovery. In England and
Wales, the Waste Management Licensing Regulations (OPSI, 1994)
had implemented the Waste Framework Directive and required the
Environment Agency to: ‘‘minimise waste and to encourage
recycling and energy recovery’’ (DTI, 1996, 11). This language
was signiﬁcant because recycling and energy recovery became
equivalent instead of the former being prioritised as previously in
the waste hierarchy.
This meant that, between 1996 and 1998, NPTCBC drew up a
new waste strategy aimed at much greater waste recovery. This
strategy was devised in a technocratic fashion with the assistance
of staff from a wholly-owned local authority waste disposal
company, or LAWDC and engineering consultants, Currie and
Brown. The waste plan was ambitious. It involved £32m of private-
ﬁnance initiative (PFI) funding for a recovery facility. But revenue
would be raised from planned agreements with neighbouring
Bridgend County Borough Council (BCBC) and the City and County
of Swansea (CCS) to take their waste.
The voices of the communities most impacted by the MREC
siting decision needed to be added into NPTCBC’s decision-making
process. The broader social history of exposures to pollution in the
area around Crymlyn Burrows, described in the previous section,
meant there was little trust on all sides from the outset. This meant
opportunities for constructive stakeholder engagement were
undermined or, never properly considered (cf. Flyvbjerg, 1998).
At the time of the MREC proposal being announced publicly in
October 1998, the greatest sense of distrust from local communi-
ties was aimed towards a range of public bodies. First, staff and
politicians working at the City and County of Swansea were held in
low regard for their historical failure to act over the governance of
the United carbon black plant. Second, given the recent deaths,
there was serious disaffection with staff and politicians at NPTCBC
for its encouragement of ‘dirty’ industry, like Gower Chemicals, to
locate in and around the Crymlyn Burrows industrial park. Third,
there was incomprehension of EAW, and its predecessor the Alkali
Inspectorate, for seeming unwillingness, or inability, to enforce
environmental regulations.
NPTCBC’s new twenty-ﬁve-year waste strategy, with the MREC
at its heart, was never discussed publicly before its unveiling on
October 1st, 1998, according to local residents and protestors
(Fisher, 1998a; SWEP, 1998c). The local community councillor for
Coedffranc, Harry Bebell, was quoted in the Swansea-based South
West Evening Post (SWEP) saying that many residents felt the deal
to build and operate the MREC was already signed, sealed and
delivered: ‘‘If this isn’t cut and dried then nothing is’’ (Fisher,
1998c). In truth, the Technical and Property Services Committee at
NPTCBC had approved the project internally a week before
announcing it publicly. This was on the basis of a presentation
by HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd. With internal approval in place, a
four-year construction/licensing phase was then initiated. NPTCBC
immediately held a community meeting in Crymlyn Burrows on
the far eastern edge of Swansea but the public were not invited to
make substantive inputs into the development plans. Within
24 hours, residents were vowing – in signiﬁcant numbers – to ﬁght
it (Fisher, 1998a). Objections were based on the perceived social
iniquity of locating what they felt would be a potentially hazardous
industrial activity next to Swansea’s deprived East Side.
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In this rapidly polarising situation, concerns about the potential
health effects of incineration, were swiftly raised. Some local
residents said residents suffered high rates of poor health
indicators in the area (SWEP, 1998a). Providing information on
the MREC framed in terms of risk was never going to assuage
community concerns (cf. Petts, 1992). HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd,
NPTCBC and Environment Agency Wales (EAW) put up further
public displays at community meetings with unfavourable
reactions. In spite of formal objections from the community, the
NPTCBC Environment and Consumer Services Committee gave the
MREC project unanimous support at a special meeting in March
1999 (Fisher, 1999; Porter, 1999). On this occasion, council leader
Noel Crowley was visibly angry with dissenters from a local
environmental group (NGO1) who were present. NGO1 handed out
leaﬂets to councillors’ suggesting that the engineering behind
incineration was scientiﬁcally ﬂawed. Councillor Crowley tore up
the leaﬂets and demanded that the protestors leave.
The planning application for the MREC was approved by
NPTCBC’s planning committee in April 1999. The Welsh Secretary,
Alun Michael, decided not to call in the application, i.e. take the
approval decision away from NPTCBC (SWEP, 1999). On September
8th, 2000, a contract was signed between two councils, NPTCBC
and Bridgend CBC, and the developer, HLC to jointly manage waste
from these two neighbouring councils (SWEP, 2000). Later that
month, NPTCBC promised to work closely with the community. On
October 25th, however, neighbouring Coedffranc Community
Council objected to a lack of consultation time on the detailed
matters part of the planning permission. On November 1st,
detailed matters were nevertheless approved at a NPTCBC
Planning Committee meeting. The next day, NPTCBC Leader, Noel
Crowley, reportedly accused Coedffranc Community Council of
‘‘telling lies’’ about the likely health impact of the plant claiming:
‘‘People are using this for politics’’ (Lewis, 2000).
Between 2000 and 2002, scientists and speakers sympathetic to
the precautionary principle were enlisted by the dissenter network
(e.g. Connett & Webster, 1987; Howard & Saunders, 1999; Webster
& Connett, 1989). These scientists and speakers bolstered the
dissenters’ position. It was repeatedly suggested that knowledge
about the cumulative and combinatorial impacts of incinerating
polluting substances was still in its infancy and not scientiﬁcally
clear cut, as EAW and the developers suggested (WOS, 2001).
By January 2001, construction of the MREC facility was
underway. The local membership of the far-left Socialist Workers
Party (SWP) linked with disaffected local community members.
The SWP was committed to direct action against the MREC and
refused to engage with the planning process. It circulated leaﬂets
with information about the MREC. Two community-led protest
groups, PG1 and PG2, then formed simultaneously. In March 2001,
PG1 members began leaﬂeting the community with information
on health and environmental concerns about incineration. These
were the citizen scientists (cf. Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Wynne,
1996).
Professor Ronan Lyons of Iechyd Morgannwg Health Authority
(IMHA) was then included by the developer network as a consultee
to the IPPC application. Lyons was concerned about potential
health impacts. Later in March 2001, a community march went
onto the MREC site. In April, a local Labour National Assembly
Member, Val Field, brought stakeholders together in a consultation
exercise (SWEP, 2001b, cf. Healey, 1992). All parties were
deadlocked in a highly acrimonious atmosphere.
Marches and direct action reached a peak in the summer of
2001. The pressure group PG2, which pursued direct action against
the plant, its operators and the regulator, now considered legal
action against NPTCBC for its alleged lack of proper public
consultation. The environmental group NGO1 and the community
pressure group PG1 continued their contestation of the science of
incineration by targeting three powerful documents: an air quality
report and two associated health impact assessments (HIAs) for
the IPPC application (cf. Keller, 2009). On September 28th, 2001,
results of a ﬁrst HIA were given. Using the language of risk
assessment familiar to the developers and the regulator, consul-
tant JacobsGibb predicted that sulphur dioxide (SO2) exposure
could result in: ‘‘5 deaths and 6 hospital admissions . . . [being]
brought forward over the 25-year operating life of the plant’’
(JacobsGibb, 2001).
Alarm bells rang with the community. The matter was raised in
the Welsh Assembly (Dicks, 2002; SWEP, 2001a; WM, 2002). Prof.
Lyons of the IMHA asked for an independent review of the SO2
modelling. JacobsGibb then submitted a ‘‘Revised Air Quality and
HIA’’ Report to Environment Agency Wales (EAW) in late January
2002 (JacobsGibb, 2002). Professor Lyons was now satisﬁed
statistical errors had been made in the ﬁrst report. Amidst
recriminations on all sides, EAW granted the MREC operators an
IPPC licence on May 9th, 2002. Just as in the 1970s with the United
carbon black plant dispute, the regulator set up a community
liaison committee (discussed in detail in Section 5.4). The intention
was to smooth relations between the community and the MREC’s
developer-operators (cf. Healey, 1992; Petts, 1995).
In 2002, the MREC began its operational phase. This was
chequered with numerous governance problems (BBC, 2010, 2012;
Elston, 2002; SWEP, 2003b). First, in August 2003, only a year into
its planned 25-year operational phase, there was a major ﬁre. It
lasted ﬁve days and covered the local area in thick smoke and
polluted local seawater (Greaney, 2003; SWEP, 2003a). Some of the
facility’s structure was extensively damaged. An inconclusive ﬁre
report suggested inefﬁcient hydration of a bio-ﬁlter may have
caused the blaze. Those in the developer network suspected
sabotage by community members (Lewis, 2003; D1 Interview,
2009). A minute from a Liaison Committee meeting notes: ‘‘[a
community member] stated that the ﬁre was caused deliberately
and that this was a well-known fact’’ (Point 4.2, Minutes, Liaison
Committee meeting, 22.9.03).
Although the MREC was repaired within six months, the
private co-developer HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd. went into
administration in October 2005 with debts of around £40 million.
In 2006, it was reported that losses of £67m would accrue to
owner NPTCBC over the original 25-year period unless a new
operating partner could be found (Shipton, 2008). The Bank of
Scotland (BoS), the PFI funder, claimed NPTCBC was liable for its
losses on the original £40m loan. In November 2006, the council
settled with the bank out of court. The MREC has since been run as
a wholly-owned council operation: Neath Port Talbot Recycling
Ltd. However, in 2008, NPTCBC faced a £5m breach-of-contract
lawsuit from Bridgend CBC. In turn, NPTCBC demanded £54m
from engineering consultants, Currie and Brown Group. This
ﬁgure indicated the scale of NPTCBC’s losses on the project at that
point.
The dissenters’ concerns about the scientiﬁc merits of
incineration reignited in 2006 when emissions’ data for that year
apparently showed the incinerator operating periodically at up to
twelve times the legal limit for dioxins. This was disputed by
NPTCBC. But dioxin limits were breached again in 2010 (BBC, 2010)
and again in 2012 (BBC, 2012). In 2010, the plant was forced to shut
down for six months by EAW. It was reported that ‘‘Breaches were
not ever at levels to cause health problems’’ (BBC, 2011). However,
similar to the experience with the United carbon black factory forty
years earlier, NPTCBC was forced to extensively refurbish the MREC
site, clean it and install more sophisticated air pollution monitor-
ing equipment. This ought to have ensured that better air quality
standards were maintained. But, in late 2012, NPTCBC had again
agreed to stop operations while an EAW investigation was
launched into further dioxin breaches (BBC, 2012). NPTCBC had
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accepted a formal caution from EAW in 2010 incident, but in
2012 the severity of the incident was disputed by the council’s
waste planner C1 at NPTCBC (C1 Interview, 2012). By contrast, B4
an environmentalist in the dissenter network, disagreed suggest-
ing that the continuing problems at the site were ‘‘not insigniﬁ-
cant’’ and were due to not operating the incinerator at full capacity
(B4 Interview, 2012).
From this recent history of environmental governance in this
case study area, the key networks and actors that we have
identiﬁed are expanded upon below.
4.3. Networks
Fig. 2 shows the networks and actors classiﬁed by risk
perception and governmentality. We begin with the regulatory
network as it provides the context within which the decision-
making process unfolds. The developer network must operate
within the regulatory framework and is often closely aligned to the
regulator’s activities. The dissenters, however, respond to the new
development as an unwanted imposition of power and seek to
develop their own legitimacy to counter the dominant framing of
the development process.
4.3.1. Regulatory network
In the regulatory network, E1 is a senior ofﬁcial at
Environment Agency Wales (EAW). At the time the MREC was
proposed, E1 and colleagues were based in EAW’s south-west
Wales regional ofﬁce in Swansea. In relational terms, the EAW
ofﬁces were part of a UK-wide regulatory network centred on the
Environment Agency (EA) headquarters in Bristol, England. The
EA’s large network draws its political legitimacy from an array of
powerful institutions and documents. The latter include Europe-
an Union (EU) waste management laws which are transposed in
Cardiff and London. At the time of the MREC application in 1998,
E1 and colleagues in Swansea were dealing with various requests
from developer networks for operating approval. The most
economically powerful and legitimising document of all for
developers was a waste management operating licence. The
granting of a licence will ‘make or break’ most proposed waste
industry developments. Determinations are done by EAW staff
over several months by comparing the various forms of evidence
provided by developers (see Section 4.3.2) with the procedural
steps that take place inside the regulatory network. In doing this,
E1 and colleagues expected to act closely with those in the
developer network. E1 stated that, when EAW was involved with
controversial developments, such closeness did not exist with
representatives of local communities. Stakeholder engagement
was therefore felt to be problematic.
4.3.2. Developer network
In the developers’ network was C1, a senior waste planner from
Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council (NPTCBC). There was
also D1, a former senior manager from HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd.,
the Portuguese-owned waste engineering ﬁrm. Unlike the regula-
tor E1, C1 and D1 were ‘the regulated’, i.e. operating in a much
more proscribed space (cf. Murdoch, 2006). C1 and D1 conformed
to the rules on waste management regulated by E1 and colleagues
but still had some room to negotiate thanks to their closer working
relations with EAW. Between 1998 and 2002, the developer
network systematically built up a wide range of powerful
documents via the planning system to help achieve its aim of
constructing and operating the MREC waste facility. These
included planning permission, an Environmental Statement (ES)
(HLC, 1998), two Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) (JacobsGibb,
2001, 2002) and an Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
(IPPC) operating licence.
4.3.3. Dissenter network
In the dissenters’ network, B1 and B2 were two experienced
local environmental activists from the south-west Wales region
working for NGO1. They had heterogeneous links to a selection of
community, political and precautionary science groups. The
dissenters openly supported the precautionary principle (cf.
Wiedemann & Schutz, 2005).
As part of their efforts to counter the plans of the developer
network, NGO1 focused largely on the license determining
activities of the regulator. NGO1 linked up with another
environmental activist, B4, who operates nationally in the UK,
as well as a local community protest group, PG1. Their members
included A1 and A2. NGO1 and its supporters operated in a more
ﬂuid space than that of the developer and regulatory networks (cf.
Murdoch, 2006). All of those in NGO1’s dissenter network were
determined to ﬁght the MREC project. However, they chose to
oppose it on its scientiﬁc merits and social (in)justice and did not
engage in direct action. The dissenter network concluded that
incineration was the most contentious technology on the site. They
felt that it was a short-term waste solution that discourages
recycling. They believed it was poorly regulated, potentially risky
in terms of burning mixed waste (plastics) and a step backwards in
terms of improvements to the environmental quality of the local
area since the 1980s. In the following section, we analyse how
power plays out in practice in our case study.
5. Exploring power in practice
We covered two distinct time periods with our qualitative
interviews, primary source documents, database of publicly-
available secondary source material, and social network data:
(1) 1998–2002 – the planning application and the issuing of a
licence to operate, and
(2) 2002 to the present – the subsequent operation of the plant.
In the sections that follow, we concentrate our analysis on both
of these periods with interview data from 2009 and 2012. The
former is largely about the decision making process of period 1,
while the latter either introduces or strengthens the picture we
have of period 2.
When the MREC facility was ﬁrst proposed, on the one side were
the technocratically-minded and procedurally-oriented developer
and regulatory networks. On the other side was the dissenter
network. The latter appeared unwilling to place the trust of its
members in the expertise, power and authority being exercised by
both the developers and the regulator (cf. Beck, 1999; Whatmore,
2009).
In presenting our analysis, we drew heavily upon our inter-
views. This was because these provide the best picture of the
networks, the framing of the issues and of actors’ perceptions of
their own power to act (based upon the arrangement of theirs and
others’ key documents). Throughout, though, we have triangulated
this material with a rich database of materials (e.g. press cuttings,
documents, planning and licensing records and records of the
Liaison Committee) to inform our interpretation. What emerges is
a detailed portrait of the ways in which power works in practice
with traditional top-down techniques of governmentality ulti-
mately prevailing. The regulatory network is shown to marshal
actors in the developer network with its similar technocratic
framing of science, technology and engineering.
However, the techniques of governmentality that we suggest
were deployed to get the MREC facility up and running can also be
said to have failed. There was a signiﬁcant loss of legitimacy for the
waste licensing process when opportunities for public participa-
tion were not put forward (e.g. genuine consultation on the
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planning application and meaningful engagement in the Liaison
Committee).
Our results are structured around sociologic diagrams and
social network analysis (SNA) ﬁgures. The former evidence the
varied and changing social constructions of knowledge of the
contributors. By using this unique analytical framework with its
attendant high level of local detail, we convey the sophisticated
knowledge deployed by the dissenter network in its bid to overturn
the planning and licensing decisions. Our use of SNA shows
networks operating at the local level within a liaison committee
revealing how they are shaped by and seek to shape events (e.g.
reactions to the 2003 ﬁre). Together our sociologics and SNA
ﬁgures provide insights into the dynamic and spatial reach of
power over time through the three networks that we analyse. It is
rare to be able to capture this level of detail in local studies of
environmental protest.
5.1. Knowledge construction and power
The case study background in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 suggests that
alternative framings of the potential risks of incineration in each
network were underpinned by four key factors. First, the pre-
existing lack of trust between networks; second, the presence or
absence of shared framings of risk linked to the asymmetric power
relations between networks; third, the rapid polarisation of views
early in the MREC’s development as a result of that asymmetry;
and fourth, the ways that all these factors contributed to failed
attempts to engage in successful risk communication.
Sociologics are presented below for each network in 2009 and
then again in 2012. These provide evidence for these alternative
social constructions of knowledge with regard to power, planning
and participation. In both of these periods, interviewees are shown
in white boxes at the centre of each diagram (Fig. 3). Core beliefs
surround this box in light blue boxes linked by straight lines. These
blue belief boxes are then connected via further arrowed lines to
green and purple ‘evidence’ boxes offered in support of beliefs. In
the 2009 set of sociologic diagrams, all the highly contested
documents are shown in purple, on the right-hand side of the
diagram, e.g. the developer network’s Environmental Statement
(ES) and their two HIA and Air Quality Reports. Grey boxes indicate
the contested technologies, chieﬂy incineration, deployed at the
MREC site. In one of the 2009 diagrams, and all but one of the
2012 diagrams, the Liaison Committee is represented by a purple
and yellow box. Overall, the internal logic of interviewee’s
statements are illustrated by the ‘logic’ of connections made
between stated beliefs and supporting evidence. In this way,
mapping varied social constructions of knowledge help us to reveal
the implications of knowledge construction and power for public
participation (cf. Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2006).
5.2. 1998–2002 – planning application and licencing period
The initial period of activity covers the siting and licensing of
the Materials Recovery and Energy Centre (MREC) at Crymlyn
Burrows. Evidence for governmentality in the three actor networks
– regulatory, developer and dissenter – is highlighted. Our analysis
of the operation of the three actor networks is around three core
themes: governance and power; following procedures; and power,
space and risk. A network-by-network analysis then provides a
systematic framework showing how power is being drawn upon
by each network, how it is constructed inside and outside of the
community, and how it is projected into the community.
5.2.1. Governance and power in the regulatory network
Fig. 4 represents the social constructions of knowledge for E1
from Environment Agency Wales (EAW) in 2009. At that time, this
individual’s beliefs and ways of working were overwhelmingly
procedural, technocratic and expert-led. As part of the wider
Fig. 4. 2009 sociologic diagram for Environment Agency Licensing Ofﬁcer (E1) in the regulatory network. (For interpretation of the references to colour in text, the reader is
referred to the web version of the article.)
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regulatory network centred on the Environment Agency’s Bristol
headquarters, they were able to draw on a range of resources both
internal and external to the EAW in support of their governmental
role of evaluating the developers’ application for an IPPC operating
license. The demands of EAW’s governmental role and the sharing
of similar, technocratic frames of risk were signiﬁcant in binding
the regulator and the co-developers together in the pre-licensing
phase of the MREC project.
Following procedures
There is a blue ‘Regulatory Procedures’ belief box in Fig. 4, just
below E1’s central purple box. E1 made it clear that when
developers are successful with their pollution licence applications
they must follow EAW’s legally-binding procedures. EAW is then
obliged to issue a permit. E1 stated that they always stick to the
procedural parameters laid down in the law:
‘‘[T]he Agency’s duty is such that if the determination is done
and we ﬁnd that it meets the standards that we have got written
down . . . the Agency has no alternative . . . [but] to issue the
permit . . . We [the Agency] are constrained by what the law
tells us to do.’’ (E1 Interview, 2009)
E1 revealed that their leading risk concern was procedural. EAW
would not intervene and shut facilities down, they said, based
solely on the public’s perception of health risk:
‘‘[O]urs is a technical ecological assessment. We don’t have the
freedom to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ just because we don’t like something
or we think something else would be better, or that it should
never have been there in the ﬁrst place.’’ (E1 Interview, 2009)
As Fig. 4 shows, such statements were supported by several
named documents shown at the bottom of the sociologic. The
regulatory network draws heavily upon external resources to be
able to project power into communities. First, in terms of European
Legislation, there is the Waste Incineration Directive (WID) (2000/
76/EC) (EC, 2000) and its transposition into UK law, the Pollution
Prevention and Control (PPC) (England and Wales) Regulations 2000
(OPSI, 2000). These documents were key for EAW as it provided a
legal authority to hold together its network for incineration in
governmental terms. Second, data came from other UK incin-
erators as well as internal guidance which E1 felt conﬁdent of. This
meant support from powerful documents describing Best Available
Techniques (BAT), Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive
Cost (BATNEEC), and BAT References (BREFs). Lastly, E1 noted that
external guidance from PPC/IPPC consultees, which included the
Local Health Authority, the Local Authority, the then Countryside
Council for Wales (CCW) (now part of NRW) and the public, further
added to this individual’s level of conﬁdence in the procedures
undertaken.
Together, these documents gave E1 conﬁdence to shape
interactions with other networks. For example, these documents
codiﬁed ways in which developer networks and dissenter net-
works could behave. E1 believed that part of the problem with
operating licences was that the legal deﬁnition of ‘waste’ was
uncertain. Difﬁculties at other plants were largely put down to
operator error which shifts the ‘problem’ of community and NGO-
based dissent from the nature of the technology to the operator.
With licensing, E1 thus framed the process of incineration as a
straightforward managed operation. Only inputs and outputs
mattered, not the technological nature of the process. For this
reason, E1 was happy that in south-west Wales, once licensed, a
site that was problematic was checked ‘‘more than once a year’’.
Of course, members of the dissenter network disputed this level
of governance furiously in the licensing period. Like the Port
Tennant housewives in the United carbon black factory dispute in
1970, they demanded that EAW do something more and enforce a
stricter regime. Speciﬁcally, this meant putting into place
continuous air quality monitoring equipment. At a minimum, this
would cover the dioxin emissions which the dissenters regarded as
most contentious. They were rebuffed by the EAW on this issue. It
said an equipment trial in Nottingham had proven too expensive.
Members of PG1 responded by purchasing their own air quality
monitoring equipment. They wanted ‘independent’ scientiﬁc data
to keep alive the contested issue of health and emissions’ quality
during the operation of the plant. Ultimately, on trust issues linked
to licensing, E1 stated that Agency staff generally ‘‘spent a lot of
time with the public’’. However, in its governmental role of
facilitating central government’s pro-incineration policy, much
Agency time involved countering attempts at dissent in terms of
attacks on its legitimacy from the citizen scientists and/or direct
action at their ofﬁces and the site.
Power, space and risk
Dioxins and other emissions were not considered likely to be
problematic at Crymlyn Burrows by those in the regulatory
network. E1’s stated belief was that there were no health risks to
the local community from incineration or from any other aspect of
the MREC’s operation (see blue ‘Air Quality’ belief boxes in Fig. 4).
However, E1 agreed that smells could be a nuisance despite the
design of the plant preventing smells escaping.
E1’s deﬁnition of ‘good health’ was procedural and biophysical.
E1 drew on studies that are ‘tight focus’ i.e. largely based on
epidemiology and toxicology to make health risk assessments of
technological processes (Kemm, 2000). The broader impacts of the
MREC facility on the well-being of the local community were from
health impacts like noise, vibration and stress. These are generally
excluded from tight focus studies (cf. Dahlgren & Whitehead,
1991). When it came to dissenters’ questions about the potential
for health impacts from dioxin and particulate pollution, E1
expressed exasperation:
‘‘They don’t seem to understand that if they burn something in
their garden they are probably producing more [dioxins] . . .
[Also] going to the local social club once a year would give
people a bigger dose of PM10 [particulate matter less than
10 microns in diameter] and plenty of other pollutants than
they’ll ever get from a year’s worth of living within one mile of
this incinerator.’’ (E1 Interview, 2009)
Here, E1 relied on blue-boxed particulate and process ‘Air
Quality’ belief statements shown in Fig. 4. EAW’s position that it
would maintain air quality standards and ensure the plant’s
processes only contributes to a small percentage of maximum
ground level pollution concentrations was supported by a
powerful document that shapes the Environment Agency’s
national behaviour: UK Air Quality Standards. Overall, E1’s
procedural focus, like the Alkali Inspectors at the United carbon
black factory decades before, was not on ‘upstream’ questions
central to the dissenters’ espousal of the precautionary principle,
i.e. ‘why this technology?’ and ‘why here?’ (cf. Wynne, 1996, 2003).
Instead, EAW could only focus on downstream risk assessments of
‘how damaging to health might it be?’. In this way, the dialogue
between the regulator and the dissenters was at cross-purposes.
EAW was therefore disparaging about the ﬁrst ‘Air Quality and
HIA Report’ produced by the consultant JacobsGibb on September
28th, 2001 (JacobsGibb, 2001). This predicted ﬁve deaths and six
hospital admissions possibly being brought forward during the
plant’s 25-year operating life from sulphur dioxide exposure (SO2).
This was later shown to be an error on the part of the consultant
but signiﬁcant damage was done to public trust. E1, normally
reliant on such expert evidence, described the erroneous ﬁrst Air
Quality and HIA Report as ‘‘alarmist’’ and a ‘‘grand theoretical
assessment’’ (E1 Interview, 2009).
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5.2.2. Governance and power in the developer network
Lead developer C1 and co-developer D1 projected their own
political power into the community with the MREC development in
Crymlyn Burrows. NPTCBC had a mandate to maintain a waste
strategy, a distinctly governmental role. The delivery of the MREC
facility was a key piece of new waste infrastructure central to that
strategy.
In 2009, C1, the co-developer from NPTCBC, and D1, the co-
developer and former operator from HLC, said their leading
concerns about the MREC were related to ﬁnancial risk. They had
few upfront concerns about potential health risks to the local
community from incineration. Such health risk perceptions were
based on the close exchanges between their engineering con-
sultants and the regulatory network who all shared a technocratic,
expert-led framing of risk and its governance.
Following procedures
C1 and D1 said they had little choice but to comply with rules
and laws laid down in the politically more networked areas of
Whitehall, Cardiff and Brussels. These were enforced locally by
EAW (cf. Murdoch, 2006). Developer networks typically complain
about the way that power that is exercised by regulators but
research suggests that they are happiest dealing with statutory
bodies (Glasson, 1999; Owens, 2000; Snell & Cowell, 2006). In
general, similarly framed dialogues can save time and resources
with costly document production (and breaches of the law).
According to C1, compliance was not a straightforward task.
There is a blue box marked ‘‘Impact of ‘unanticipated events’’’ to
the top right of Fig. 5. Part of this relates to C1’s belief that the
Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) in Cardiff, now the Welsh
Government (WG), changed its mind too often. C1 says this
impacted upon Welsh councils’ ability to successfully judge the
ﬁnancial risks they were running with waste management
projects:
‘‘[I]t has been very difﬁcult to say at any moment in time what is
the best [waste] solution today and then be conﬁdent in two
years that you’ll say the same thing.’’ (C1 Interview 2009).
C1 acknowledges that EAW’s approval was key to the whole
project as it progressed. But the document marked ‘Power
Relations’ near the centre right of Fig. 5 shows that C1 also felt
that EAW was overly cautious and unreliable, a point also made by
the dissenters.
The co-developer, D1, recognised the usefulness of the local
experience of lead developer, C1, and their waste planning
colleagues in tackling the regulatory hurdles of the UK planning
system. D1 stated that they initially believed that local councils in
South Wales were able to ‘‘get things done’’ thanks to historically
rigid political party control centred on the Labour Party (cf.
Flyvbjerg, 1998). However, D1 was surprised to discover the level
of distrust based on the distinct local history of environmental
degradation found the MREC development was ﬁercely contested.
This included witnessing overt and covert attempts at dissent
towards the development (D1 Interviews, 2009, 2012). Before D1
left the project in 2005 when HLC went into receivership, they
recalled suspected criminal activity at the plant before and after
licensing in 2002:
‘‘There would be break ins at night, there would be vandalism
and the ﬁre which ultimately took the plant down for a long
period of time. I’m not sure if it was ever ofﬁcially proved to be
arson, but it’s pretty strongly felt’’ (D1 Interview, 2009)
The project became much more time-consuming and costly
than originally planned. This progressively added to D1’s negative
perceptions of the project’s ﬁnancial risk. This was even before the
ﬁre in 2003 had forced the MREC’s temporary closure and hastened
HLC’s departure from the project in 2005.
D1 felt that NPTCBC’s traditional, top-down, trust-deﬁcit
approach to risk communication never satisﬁed the perceived
health risk concerns held by the community:
‘‘We were much too late coming to the game at Neath on this
and we were beaten up because of it . . . [The lead co-developer,
C1, from NPTCBC] . . .would often stand back and let me do the
ﬁght with the locals’’ (D1 Interview, 2009).
Fig. 5. 2009 sociologic diagram for council waste planner/co-developer (C1) in the developer network.
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This reinforced D1’s impression that NPTCBC had opted for a
‘realist’ approach towards stakeholder involvement in the MREC
project, i.e. effectively stating ‘nothing we say can win these people
over to our cause’.
Power, space and risk
In terms of power and social constructions of health risks, Fig. 6
shows a blue box with D1 referring to Energy from Waste (EfW)
and incineration as ‘safe’:
‘‘I will still maintain from a personal level that I believe things
like energy-from-waste, even mass burning combustion, are
themselves safe technologies.’’ (D1 Interview, 2009)
This belief, D1 stated, was contingent on EfW plants being well
managed and run according to the strict regulatory regime set by
the Environment Agency (EA):
‘‘I’m comfortable myself with the science of the dioxins, impact
and whatever it is from different sources, and . . . at that site it is
managed quite well.’’ (D1 Interview, 2009)
Note that this view, shared with C1 and E1, was diametrically
opposed to that of the dissenters who claimed that UK waste plants
are typically not well managed, nor well regulated.
When considering the potential health risks of the new MREC
facility, D1 deferred to two key actors in their network: the
incineration engineers at fellow HLC company, Henley Burrowes
Ltd, and an external engineering consultant, Sinclair Knight Merz
(SKM). This technological support gave D1 a strong belief their
framing that were no health concerns at all with incineration.
Between the planning and construction of the MREC facility,
however, D1 changed their viewpoint on one potential health risk:
heavy lorries going to and from the site (a health impact missed in
‘tight-focus’ EIAs and HIAs):
‘‘I wouldn’t want to live next to one . . . not because of
emissions from the plant. It’s the trafﬁc impact. You have got
all these vehicles going past your house.’’ (D1 Interview,
2009)
C1 claimed that between 1998 and 2001, at the time of MREC’s
planning and licensing application, broad health impacts were not
considered in the planning system and nor was the public
consulted ‘‘as much as it is today’’ (i.e. in 2009). C1 said strategic
planning between 1998 and 2001 took no note of health.
Cumulative impacts of pollution in the communities around
Crymlyn Burrows, for example, would not have entered calcula-
tions for any of the impact assessment techniques. C1 claimed that,
people between 1998 and 2001 were less aware of the planning
system and suggested that those fearing catastrophic failures had
their risk framings coloured by the media not necessarily by the
‘facts’. Communities would struggle, said C1, to understand what
the health issues are regarding waste planning, and added that the
dissenters’ views were not representative of the majority in the
community. C1 also said that dissenting activity is rare and that
public trust still lies with this regulatory body: ‘‘The public has
faith in regulatory authorities’’ (C1 Interview, 2009).
D1 recognised an implacably different framing of risk coming
from the dissenters when they noted, early on in the licensing
phase, that they were ‘‘very good’’ at raising environmental issues
via the local press. This blue-boxed belief on ‘Public Engagement’
shown in Fig. 6 is supported by reference to the health of children
creating emotional reactions, press coverage of mobile phone
masts and electricity pylons alleging adverse health effects on
children and demands for zero emissions from industrial processes
as being unrealistic. Ultimately, this person said, the dissenters had
an alternate conception of science which ‘‘parts company with the
facts’’ (D1 Interview, 2009).
In summary, this adds further weight to evidence that members
of the developers’ and dissenters’ networks could never be
reconciled in terms of their world views. Characterising the
public’s constructions of risk as unscientiﬁc and unrealistic was
Fig. 6. 2009 sociologic diagram for co-developer (HLC) (D1) in the developer network.
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useful to the developer network. It would have helped ensure that,
post licensing, any alliance between the dissenters and the
regulator was unlikely to form. However, the dissenters have held
ﬁrm in their distrust of EAW to the present.
5.2.3. Governance and power in the dissenter network
As far as public participation was involved, the techniques and
procedures of governmentality failed with this network. The
dissenters, A1, A2, B1, B2 and B4 all expressed the opinion that the
episode revealed distinct social and environmental iniquities that
stemmed from the original siting decision in 1998.
(Not) Following procedures
Fig. 7, the combined sociologic diagram for B1 and B2 from
NGO1 in 2009, shows this sense of social and environmental
injustice feeding in the belief box entitled ‘Power Relations’. B1
said in interview in relation to ‘Political Distrust’:
‘‘There were seven sites originally and Crymlyn Burrows was
chosen I think for the potentially low political impact. It’s on the
border between two authorities so Swansea people in Port
Tennant don’t have a say in the [NPTCBC-led] planning process,
and Crymlyn Burrows is literally made up of just two streets of
residents. If they kicked up a fuss, well, they could be ignored.’’
(B1 Interview, 2009)
A2 from the community pressure group PG1 similarly added:
‘‘If they’d put this on the West of Swansea, the people there are
much more powerful than the people on the East Side . . . If they
ﬁght something, they will win.’’ (A2 Interview, 2009)
For A1, the perceived unfairness of the siting decision ﬁrst
motivated them to protest:
‘‘[A]part from the environmental things it is the social injustice.
That’s what really, really annoys me as well. More so. It’s not
fair. It’s really not fair . . . Why are we always being dumped
on?’’ (A1 Interview, 2009)
In Fig. 8, both A1 and A2 felt that the length and language of
powerful documents, like the Environmental Statement (ES), was
part of a deliberate way of keeping non-specialists from out of any
debate over the merits of the MREC. According to A2:
‘‘[Making the ES impenetrable] was the aim of producing such a
bloody big document!’’ (A2 Interview, 2009)
In general, planning procedures were seen as anti-democratic.
The way that the developer network’s political and economic
power was imposed, in part via NPTCBC and the planning system,
was also a key concern. Local environmental campaigner B2
described how NGO1 and certain community members were
actively excluded from early NPTCBC-led meetings about the
MREC:
‘‘People in Port Tennant and Crymlyn Burrows asked for us to
attend but we were shown the door’’ (B2 Interview, 2009).
Similarly, B1 remarked of NPTCBC Labour Leader, Noel Crowley,
tearing up dissenters’ leaﬂets at a public meeting (Fisher, 1999,
Porter, 1999):
Local health studies
‘‘[T]hat desire to exclude the public seems to have set the tone
for the whole project. If you frame things in that way, you are
bound to cause trouble for yourself . . . [T]he fear and
defensiveness about playing straight with the public, I think,
led to much of the problems that we saw.’’ (B1 Interview, 2009)
When details of the MREC project were placed on display
boards in local community centres, B2 felt community members
would not see it as an opportunity for engagement but rather one
of informing them of a decision already made:
‘‘The community were not getting a look in and these boards
were telling them, effectively, that they weren’t getting a look
in.’’ (B2 Interview, 2009)
Fig. 7. 2009 sociologic diagram for environmental group 1 (local) (NGO1) in the dissenters’ network.
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Any potential opportunities that the developers may have had
in boosting meaningful participation with the community in the
pre-licensing period were rapidly lost. This was thanks to the
apparently misplaced faith in the deﬁcit approach to risk
communication, pursued by the co-developers in public meetings
and in the Liaison Committee (see below for a full discussion of the
Committee). The developers assumed that opposition to the MREC
was due to dissenters’ lack of ‘factual’ information. For some of the
dissenters in the community, their deep sense of mistrust was
linked to fatalism about the end result. This may explain, at least in
part, the attraction of direct action towards the site from some
individuals. As A1 said in 2009:
‘‘If something is to be decided to be given the go-ahead, it will be
given . . . [T]he council had given planning permission for the
thing to be built so there was nothing we could do about that . . .
They don’t consult us. No, you don’t consult the public on an
impact assessment. That’s done by consultants.’’ (A1 Interview,
2009)
In May 2002, however, the developers’ approach to engagement
changed when the regulatory network gave the MREC project the
most powerful document of all – its licence to operate. A1 said:
‘‘[A]fter a couple of years of treating us as morons, idiots,
outsiders, troublemakers, then they tried the ‘Let’s be inclusive
to the community.’ It just doesn’t wash. . . . The whole
consultation thing is an absolute sham.’’ (A1 Interview, 2009)
The dissenters regarded incineration as a process that should
be opened up to scrutiny and attacked. This citizen scientist
approach (cf. Brown, 1992; Elliott et al., 2009) became central to
NGO1’s and PG1’s resistance to the power arrayed by the
developers’ and the regulatory networks in the pre-licensing
phase. It was a strategy that would continue in the operational
phase as well.
Power, space and risk
Figs. 7–9 show various members of the dissenter network all
had heightened concerns for the environmental risks from the
MREC facility, speciﬁcally the potential health risks. B4 from NGO2
said that their deﬁnition of ‘good health’ was broad and based on
the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 1946 deﬁnition, some-
thing overlooked in the planning system in England and Wales:
‘‘[T]he whole EIA regulation[s] are supposed to look at the direct
and indirect effects of the application . . . and that should
include the anxiety, causes and concern that arise from that.
The courts have accepted that anxiety is a real health effect and
there is no doubt that it shortens people’s lives; we’ve had
doctors giving testimonies, public enquiries that they’ve lost
patients because of the anxiety associated with applications.’’
(B4 Interview, 2009)
Community activist A1 from the campaign group PG1, never
openly deﬁned good health. However, they stated:
‘‘You don’t wake up every morning thinking ‘There’s an
incinerator coming and I’m going to be breathing in 2.5s,
PM2.5s, and I might get asthma.’ You don’t live like that . . .[but]
once you’ve got kids you worry about every single thing . . . All I
know is my neighbours some of whom have never smoked in
their lives, who do not drink, [who] like ﬁsh, who cook proper
food, are getting very, very ill.’’ (A1 Interview, 2012)
At the heart of the dissenter network’s concerns was the
scientiﬁc uncertainty perceived to be inherent from the burning of
mixed waste. The dissenters drew upon external resources to
increase their inﬂuence in relation to the developer and regulator
Fig. 8. 2009 sociologic diagram for community protest group 1 (PG1) in the dissenters’ network.
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networks. ‘How would dioxins, furans, NO2 and ultra-ﬁne, sub-
PM1 particulates impact upon human health either alone or in
combination?’ they asked:
‘‘On dioxins, [B4] quoted US ﬁgures for the TCCD (max)1 and
said that [internally] you shouldn’t get [exposed to] more than a
crystal of sugar in your lifetime. The data we were getting on
Crymlyn Burrows suggested people would be getting exposed
to more than that.’’ (B2 Interview, 2009)
A2 also described the level of uncertainty regarding mixed
waste:
‘‘Now, no scientist . . . has ever been able to say what happens
when you burn different combinations of things. Nobody can
tell you. With a coal-ﬁred station, you know what’s coming out,
you know what to abate. But mixed rubbish, you can’t, nobody
can tell.’’ (A2 Interview, 2009)
Fig. 9 shows that B4 expressed similar concerns in terms of
uncertainty over the high metal content in the ‘ﬂy ash’, the
material caught inside the chimney which is removed and buried
in landﬁll sites that are specially designed to take toxic materials
contaminated with heavy metals:
‘‘[I]f you can make something into a refuse-derived fuel it’s
more likely to burn better. Having said that there are a lot more
variables in the process than just the feedstock . . . it’s very
difﬁcult from an engineering perspective to stabilise it . . . unless
you’ve got a fuel like gas. So any solid fuel can have problems
. . .[T]here are also basic chemical engineering issues . . . If you
put metals into something, elemental material will come out
and . . . we’re putting far too much metal into the residual
waste . . . [heavy] metals like lead and cadmium. They’ll either
come out of the chimney or go into the ash.’’ (B4 Interview,
2009)
Fig. 9 shows that B4 believes lead and cadmium are the most
hazardous heavy metals in the ﬂy ash and need to be better
regulated.
A1 meanwhile regards ﬂy ash from incinerators as potentially
the ‘new asbestos’. Early on in the dissenter network’s struggle,
B4 examined the air quality issues for NGO1 and concluded
that dioxin output would generally be better abated by air
pollution control devices brought in after the Waste Incineration
Directive (2000). However, for B4, the greatest uncertainty in
terms of dioxin production was the creation of new dioxins,
such as polybrominateddiphenylethers (PBDEs), from the
burning of ﬂame retardant material (see Birnbaum & Staskal,
2004; Mcdonald, 2002) as well as perturbations in the air ﬂow
to the stack, and this is indicated in Fig. 9. Perturbations are
peaks in dioxin output which occur when stopping and starting
a burner’s operation (Howard, 2000; Wang & Chang-Chien,
2007).
B4’s sociologic diagram in Fig. 9 also shows how this individual
concluded from the scientiﬁc literature that non-dioxin emissions
from the MREC plant would not be abated well enough to prevent
damage to human health and the environment (COMEAP, 2009;
Dockery et al., 1993; Seaton, Godden, Macnee, & Donaldson, 1995).
B4 said:
‘‘Dioxins [are] not the whole issue. The new incinerators are
deﬁnitely different from the older ones, but not fundamentally
. . . The main difference is in the air pollution control devices . . .
[the developer-operator has] probably focused a bit too much
on dioxin. If you looked at oxides in nitrogen, there’s nothing
Fig. 9. 2009 sociologic diagram for environmental group 2 (national) (NGO2) in the dissenters’ network.
1 ‘TCCD (max)’ refers to the maximum lifetime exposure to 2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-
dioxin (TCCD) that is considered safe.
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like the same sort of reduction and these are very signiﬁcant
sources of. . . a wide range of other pollutants . . .[including]
ultra ﬁne particles [which are] sub-PM1 [in size2] . . . [and] time
and time again the science is well ahead of the engineering.’’ (B4
Interview, 2009)
B4 concludes that any risk of over exposure to pollutants comes
down to regulatory failure. Cancer and ill-health were reasonably
likely from ‘invisible’ sub-PM1 particles, B4 said. These would
readily pass through the MREC abatement ﬁlter bags, according to
B4.
In challenging the technology of incineration, A1 used B4’s
knowledge of ultraﬁne particulates to question co-developer C1
from NPTCBC:
‘‘[T]hey used a bag ﬁlter abatement system which catches
PM10s and under . . . [Even] if you’re going to have the best
abatement system the world’s ever made . . . we [still] don’t
know what’s going up the chimney and . . . we don’t know how
small the particles are. [At one point, C1 from NPTCBC] said [to
me] ‘‘Yeah, but it’ll collect PM10s down to [PM] 2.5.’’ I said
‘‘Yeah, but some things are going to be smaller than 2.5.’’ [And
the reply was:] ‘‘Oh, that doesn’t matter.’’ (A1 Interview, 2009)
For the dissenters, to learn of this dismissal of PM1s as
insigniﬁcant to human health when studies were revealing the
converse, suggested that the governance of environmental risk at
the MREC was based on arbitrary interpretations of science. The
developers, they felt, failed to appreciate the local circumstances.
This included the negative environmental history of the site and
the distinct topography around it. Local hills put the facility at
greater risk of temperature inversions each year. This would lead to
more episodes of intense localised pollution.
In the contestation between the different networks, the
dissenters’ arguments for a precautionary approach to incineration
– in terms of the science and engineering behind it – became at
least as sophisticated as those of the other two networks. What
they lacked, though, was the combined strength of sufﬁcient
networked individuals and documentary evidence powerful
enough to win the day. This was the case in both the community
setting and externally where key decisions would be made (e.g.
siting decisions, licensing decisions). The regulatory network could
make its power felt in the community (cf. Grifﬁn, 2012), but the
dissenters were embedded within it and struggled to reach into
regulatory and/or developer spaces.
5.3. 2002 to the present – operational phase
In the second phase of activity, the siting and licensing of the
MREC had been agreed. The plant at Crymlyn Burrows was
operational. In this period, from 2002 to the present, we further
highlight the evidence for governmentality in the three actor
networks – regulatory, developer-operator and dissenter. In
particular, we focus on how and where the pre-licensing
contestation of the science of incineration continues, albeit in a
more constrained and muted form in the Liaison Committee.
Dissent over the MREC has shifted from Protest Group 1’s (PG1)
public contestation over the scientiﬁc legitimacy of the whole
enterprise to a more conﬁned debate with the operator and the
regulator over: (1) actual emissions data, (2) whether the plant
should have continuous instead of semi-continuous monitoring for
dioxins, and (3) the participatory nature of the forum for ongoing
community engagement at the site (i.e. the Liaison Committee). In
other words, in this period we witnessed an external regulatory
space being increasingly subsumed within a local space.
In the operational phase from 2002, the continued contestation
of the science of incineration (and of other technologies) at the
Liaison Committee, reinforced the belief amongst the developer-
operators and the dissenters when interviewed in 2009 that their
respective opposition was inevitable. As shown above, this
contestation was based upon different world views of risk
governance and of what they mean in spatial terms (cf. Keller,
2009). For the regulator and developer, risk was always
constructed in an aspatial manner. By contrast, for the community,
risk was always about what it meant for them in their immediate
area. The more confrontational disputes of the licensing period,
mainly outside the Liaison Committee, were replaced around
2002 by more muted exchanges once the plant was a ‘fact on the
ground’. The key issue of contestation and debate that emerges was
access to and the quality of the actual emissions data, in particular
for dioxins. This debate was now held in the Liaison Committee –
the nearest available forum for dissenters to appeal in. This
presented relatively little satisfaction to those community
members who still believed, as they did at the very outset of
their protest, that the governance of the site was not strict enough.
From the outset, they demanded reassurance with continuous
monitoring of dioxins. This was something the EAW had said was
untried and likely prohibitive. In 2009, after seven years of
operation, the original core community dissenters made up of ﬁve
individuals and the MREC’s management were still prepared to sit
down together. However, by 2011, the most vociferous of the
community dissenters had begun dropping off the committee.
They spoke of fatigue and disillusion. The work of the Liaison
Committee and what it reveals about the dynamic of power are
discussed further below in Section 5.4.
5.3.1. Continuing to impose regulatory space: the regulatory network
When the most powerful document, the Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (IPPC) licence, was agreed for the MREC in
2002, the Environment Agency Wales’ (EAW) functional role
changed signiﬁcantly. As EAW’s role moved from licensing to
enforcement, signiﬁcant powers were conferred onto the devel-
oper-operator network which had the potential, in turn, to alter
the EAW’s relationships with the other networks. The EAW and
the dissenters, for example, might have become more sympa-
thetic to each other’s points of view seeing as both apparently now
wanted the plant’s operations scrutinised. As we show below, this
has not turned out to be the case. Also, less unexpectedly given
that they continue to share the same technocratic framing of the
risks of incineration, the regulator and the developer-operator
remain reasonably similarly aligned despite some qualms by the
latter.
The interviewee from EAW in 2009, E1, refused to take part in
our follow-up series of interviews in late 2012. However, the
Agency did respond in writing to several questions. These
responses are shown in green boxes in Fig. 10. Green boxes
represent statements of perceived supporting ‘facts’ in each
sociologic diagram as compared to the blue-boxed statements of
‘belief’.
Following procedures
The data presented in Fig. 10 from 2012 reveals how, just as was
indicated in 2009, EAW attempted to govern operators’ behaviour
through the following of procedures. As at the licensing stage,
these are based on legal commitments many of which are decided
elsewhere. In this case, many come from outside of Wales. For
example, there is Internal Environment Agency Guidance, the
Waste Incineration Directive (WID) (2000/76/EC) and UK National
Legislation. In terms of governance, these procedures are meant to
operationalise the enforcement functions of the EAW. In 2012, the
Agency reiterated E1’s previously stated position on emission limit
values (ELVs) (from 2009) saying simply that:2 Sub-PM1 is particulate matter less than 1 mm in diameter.
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‘‘I think these kinds of things actually do happen more often
than is actually reported and the dialogue usually stays outside
of any press interest and is dealt with between the operator and
the Environment Agency.’’
Similarly, in terms of whether incineration emissions are
monitored continuously or sampled periodically, EAW (2013)
states:
‘‘The incinerator is ﬁtted with a continuous emissions
monitoring system (CEMS) for certain of the stack ﬂue gases.’’
What is not stated in EAW (2013), however, is that CEMS does
not work continuously for dioxins. As C1 notes in interview in
2012, dioxins continue to be sampled periodically at the MREC site.
Nothing had changed in the confrontation between both sides on
this point since before 2002. In this way, EAW’s position on
enforcing the law on dioxin monitoring – i.e. it’s not mandatory to
monitor continuously – remains popular with operators who
themselves might otherwise have to pay for any new equipment.
Nevertheless, as the national environmental campaigner from
NGO2 – B4 – points out below, continuous dioxin monitoring
would at least buy the Environment Agency trust at contested
incineration sites across the UK like Crymlyn Burrows (see also
Donaldson, Lane, Ward, & Whatmore, 2013, for similar issues
relating to ﬂood risk).
The ‘Monitoring/Sampling’ and ‘Emissions Quality’ boxes in
Fig. 10 show that EAW (2013) counters the dissenter networks’
position on monitoring with arguments about resources. These
statements support its provision of the CEMS system, the
robustness of the monitoring equipment, the willingness to
investigate troublesome sites, and periodic audits of emissions
data in the local air and water. Such arguments, made since 2002 at
Crymlyn Burrows, have not helped build trust with those most
critical of the MREC plant. Members of the dissenter network
claim, as we show below, that the resources required to prevent
the licensing of the MREC and better enforce a stricter regime later
on have not been in evidence. A shift in allegiances by EAW and the
dissenters – to a much closer alignment based on a shared sense of
purpose – therefore did not occur largely because of this ongoing
trust deﬁcit. Such a deﬁcit had existed for decades before the
licensing phase began in 1998 given the long history of
environmental degradation in the area (which was described in
Section 4). According to the dissenters, this sense of mistrust was
exacerbated by EAW’s perceived failures throughout the licensing
phase and then during the operational phase.
Similarly, the power relations between the EAW and the
developer-operator’s network continued much as they did pre-
2002. EAW maintained its striated or proscribed space for NPTCBC
and HLC to operate in (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Murdoch, 2006)
(at least up until 2005 for HLC when it went into administration).
This controlled space ﬁrst highlighted in the licensing phase
nevertheless appeared to offer the operator(s) some room for
manoeuvre despite a serious ﬁre in 2003, disputed dioxin emissions
data in 2006, and two shut downs for dioxin breaches in 2010 and
2012. On dioxins, for example, the public provision of emissions data
can still be delayed by many weeks after a breach of an emission
limit value (ELV) occurs. This apparently happened in 2010 and may
well have occurred again in the autumn of 2012. EAW has a
graduated regime of warnings, investigations and penalties before
closure is sought and at each stage, evidence is presented by both
sides and outcomes are negotiated.
Finally, in terms of responding to a speciﬁc question about
public access to its public register of records, as indicated in the top
left of Fig. 10, EAW (2013) states:
‘‘We are legally obliged to maintain and make available
public registers of speciﬁed information. We go beyond these
legal requirements and also make available our Compliance
Fig. 10. 2012 sociologic diagram for Environment Agency Wales (EAW) in the regulatory network.
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Assessment Reports for permitted installations. The public
register is available during normal ofﬁce hours and if an
appointment is made we can also provide personal support to
use the system.’’
As we will see in Section 5.3.3, the dissenters continue to contest
both the ease of access of these records and their interpretation.
5.3.2. Working in contested spaces: the developer-operator network
In Fig. 11, the IPPC licence (now on the left-hand side of the
diagram) is clearly linked to the grey boxed technology of
incineration. In 2012, it remained the focus of contestation
between the operators and the dissenters. However, post-2002,
this contestation had become progressively more muted as
compared to the heated exchanges in the licensing period. This
has been due in large part to the normalising experience of the
Liaison Committee.
By 2012, former co-developer D1 had not worked at the site for
seven years, but nevertheless remained aware of the changing
ﬁnancial circumstances at the MREC. For example:
‘‘I think about . . . four or ﬁve years ago they did seek to re-tender
the operation of the facility out to the private sector . . . it was
stopped and the authority decided to carry on. It might have been
a matter of just budgetary limitations and what they would need
to pay a private contractor would have been a lot more than what
they could manage themselves.’’ (D1 Interview, 2012)
D1 had also read media reports concerning the 2010 and
2012 shutdowns and considered the causes and implications
below from the waste industry’s perspective.
Following procedures
In terms of following procedures for dioxin production, the
striated or proscribed space in which council waste planners
operate is unchanged:
‘‘Dioxin production is very tightly controlled. We have had
issues with dioxin, probably since 2009 but they are dealt with
or you know if we have to take remedial action or whatever, we
take remedial action . . . obviously the plant is operating under
the waste incineration directive rules.’’ (C1 Interview, 2012)
Indeed, the actions of the locally-based regulator, EAW, shown
to the right of C1 in Fig. 11, remain driven by the European-level
Waste Incineration Directive (WID). C1 actively looked for legitima-
cy from EAW saying of the Materials Recovery and Energy Centre
(MREC):
‘‘The Environment Agency, they wouldn’t let the plant operate if
they believed that there was a . . . signiﬁcant health risk with it,
whether it was dioxin or anything else.’’ (C1 Interview, 2012)
This statement was made despite C1’s known criticisms of EAW
from 2009, and these are shown in Fig. 11. Here, C1 states that
there isn’t a level-playing ﬁeld for dioxin enforcement between
small and large potential polluters (e.g. Corus). C1 also says that
EAW was overly responsive to public pressure (something that the
dissenters have claimed in 2009 and 2012 was not the case). By
contrast, D1 remembers a three-way power struggle, at least up
until 2005, with C1 allegedly putting pressure on EAW in order to
get HLC to do things:
‘‘I did sense that the [EAW] role went beyond what they would
typically do. I had no feeling for whether this was driven by
their own internal concerns or whether they were being goaded
a bit . . . by [C1] at Neath Port Talbot Council who . . . was
sometimes using the agency as kind of a whipping boy to put
pressure on us to do various things.’’ (D1 Interview, 2012)
Power, space and risk
In interview in 2012, C1 reafﬁrmed their construction of
knowledge about the safety of dioxin production at the MREC site.
Fig. 11. 2012 sociologic diagram for council waste planner/co-developer (C1) in the developer network.
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They claimed that it is safe, and as shown above, legitimacy for this
belief was sought from EAW. This is another unchanged belief from
2009. C1 therefore continued to counter the dissenters’ central
claim that in precautionary terms, incineration should be
considered unsafe.
In the ‘Emissions Data’ box in Fig. 11, C1 stated that the semi-
continuous sampling regime is ﬁne. Then, C1 offered some
comments about the importance of costs to getting the business
model right. C1 stated in the ‘‘Impact of Events’’ box in Fig. 11, that
‘poor’ calculations in HLC’s business model led to the loss of the PFI
agreement. C1 then described how the continuing problems with
the incinerator at the plant are proving costly. This is because of the
need to comply with EAW’s permitting levels:
‘‘Very recently we’ve started to have a recurrence of tripping
over the permit limits when we do . . . tests and we’re going to
have to make a decision soon about whether in fact this ongoing
expenditure that that creates for us in terms of locating and
ﬁxing the problems . . . continues to be viable or not, compared
with some of the other options, which are essentially burning
the material off site.’’ (C1 Interview, 2012)
D1 stated, however, that their understanding from industry
press articles is that the MREC is currently operating well below
capacity. This automatically introduces combustion problems
including higher dioxin outputs:
‘‘The authority itself is running [the MREC] in a slightly different
conﬁguration than how it was originally built and designed, but
are doing so as kind of an interim measure . . . It was working
generally alright . . . [But now] [t]he plant itself seems to be
working at a much smaller scale than was originally designed
. . . The waste handled was only in the range of I think . . . 12,000
tonnes as opposed to the design original, the design capacity in
2002 was around 50,000 tonnes. . . . I suspect that the low
tonnage throughput relative to the size of the plant is one of the
problems they’re having.’’ (D1 Interview, 2012)
Whatever the cause of the combustion problems, changing
economic circumstances have made stopping incinerating at
Crymlyn Burrows a more likely future option for C1. The business
case suffered from the facility’s troubled choice of technologies – as
D1 notes in Fig. 12. Since 2002 there has been a much greater
supply of pre-sorted household waste thanks to a greater uptake of
recycling in the county borough. In this context, although it was
not mentioned in interview, C1 would be even less likely to pay for
continuous dioxin monitoring, which the dissenters continue to
insist on. This lack of investment would make an already costly
facility even less economically viable and suggests a decision to
close or sell the MREC had already been taken in late 2012. The
MREC and its contracts have since gone out to tender, in March
2014, but a buyer appears not to have been found (WG, 2014).
5.3.3. Reclaiming space? The dissenter network
In 2012, the contestation over making ‘safe’ the dioxin
emissions from the Materials MREC remained at the heart of the
dissenters’ contestation. However, protest, whether via direct
action or citizen science, appeared to have faded out at least from
the original core community members. There was a distinct sense
of campaign fatigue by 2012. Those in the dissenter network
remain most upset about EAW, which was encouraged to act as a
tougher enforcer of the WID regulations. The dissenters continue
to be very critical of EAW in terms its ‘expertise’ (cf. Wynne, 1996).
The dissenters also remain unhappy with the developer-operators
despite coming into more regular contact with them once the
Liaison Committee meetings began.
(Not) Following procedures
By the end of 2012, the dissenters had been on the receiving end
of hierarchical governance for well over a decade with the licensing
Fig. 12. 2012 sociologic diagram for co-developer-operator (HLC) (D1) in the developers’ network.
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and operation of the site. Their ﬁght during the operating period
was over actual emissions data. As Figs. 13–15 all show, this was
linked to the same beliefs about the MREC facility expressed in
2009, e.g. cumulative effects, the precautionary principle, uncer-
tainty, expertise and the social injustice of locating the MREC in a
disadvantaged area (cf. Rittel & Webber, 1973).
For the dissenters, the ﬁght over access to emissions data has
become the key to their hopes of getting the MREC shut down.
They knew, like C1, that too many shutdowns would likely put the
facility out of business both in terms of costs of repairs, and the
public pressure on EAW to enforce its regulations and fears of the
loss of marketability of the MREC to any third party buyer in the
future. That said, getting access to the data in a timely fashion and
its interpretation has not been straightforward. B1, from the local
NGO, notes that the data produced by the MREC is only partial. It
also gets delivered late to the community. In response to a
question about the closure of the plant in 2012, B1 asked
rhetorically:
‘‘This [complete inventory of emissions] is not monitored
24 hours, so at what other times has it been breaching the limits
and it just simply hasn’t been detected? . . . I read in one of the
[December 2012] reports that it was a few months ago that the
emissions were exceeded and . . . it’s only now they’re acting on
it.’’ (B1 Interview, 2012)
B4 points out that, if the dioxin data were continuous, its
publication by the MREC and EAW would boost transparency and
public trust:
‘‘After the ﬁrst examples of the breaches [in 2010], which were
certainly not insigniﬁcant . . . I think from memory it was about
12 times, like 1.2 nanograms per cubic metre . . . The Environment
Agency . . . could have acquired continuous sampling [technology
via continuous emissions monitoring systems or CEMS] to
reassure the public and to make sure that the plant was operating
more safely, but they didn’t. [But] they just carried on with the
same old spot sampling which is almost inevitably going to
ensure that the public don’t trust you . . . Instead of trying to
reassure . . . the public in a meaningful way, they just pretend
that they know what’s coming out.’’ (B4 Interview, 2012)
As well as demonstrating the continuing expertise of dissenters
on emissions, B4 also revealed how a process of learning has been
taking place on emissions monitoring. The emissions data is held on
the public register at the south-west Wales ofﬁce of EAW in
Llandarcy. The community dissenters are nevertheless suspicious of
its accuracy:
‘‘You can go to the Environment Agency and look through their
ﬁles at all the data and you know whether it’s accurate or not,
who’s to say. But it’s all there you know, every time they
measure things it goes on ﬁle within, I think it’s 28 days.’’ (A1
Interview, 2012)
They also feel that the recent computerization of the records
made the register less useful:
‘‘We were having problems with the public register. It’s not . . .
as good as it used to be because they appear to be wanting to do
everything in a computerised fashion, rather than letting us be
able to look through the ﬁles, which is much easier . . . Although
you think, well with a computer you can search things out,
when you actually have the ﬁles in front of you and you can
rootle through them, you actually ﬁnd things that you weren’t
looking for.’’ (B2 Interview, 2012)
This perceived failure to overcome dominant power relations
by working within the established structures of governance has led
some dissenters to reconsider their strategic approach and opt for
more direct action. For example, A1 said in 2009, said that they
Fig. 13. 2012 sociologic diagram for environmental group 1 (local) (NGO1) in the dissenters’ network.
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Fig. 15. 2012 sociologic diagram for environmental group 2 (national) (NGO2) in the dissenters’ network.
Fig. 14. 2012 sociologic diagram for community pressure group 1 (PG1) in the dissenters’ network.
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personally regretted having chosen the non-confrontational route
of the ‘citizen scientist’:
‘‘There’s no point. What I would want to see is more direct
action . . . The one thing I’ve learned over the ten years that
we’ve been doing it [is] you keep on doing [conventional
protesting], but there is absolutely no point at all.’’ (A1
Interview, 2009)
The same sense of frustration was again noted by A1 in 2012:
‘‘You keep knocking your head against the wall. For instance, I
haven’t been on the internet to look into any new research into
health problems due to incinerators say. If I did and found some,
what am I going to do with it? Talk to friends maybe . . . And
that’s about it.’’ (A1 Interview, 2012)
A2 felt the same:
Q. Would you recommend [to] a group today who is concerned to
do what you all did?
‘‘No, I would say don’t waste your stamps on the letters . . .
they’re being a nuisance to the Environment Agency, because all
they do, from what I could see, is get somebody to ﬁle them
away and I’m sure they were ignored.’’ (A2 Interview, 2009)
The dissenting voices here were originally drawn to an ethic of
protest which was not revolutionary in a Marxist or Deleuzian way,
but rather protesting in the face of power, i.e. local and central
government control of a waste development. Arguably, the citizen
science dissenters did beat the development on its own scientiﬁc
and engineering terms – not least with the repeated dioxin
breaches having proved their fears correct (as stated in the
interviews of A1, A2, B1 and B2 in 2012). They used arguments
based around evidence and ideas, but in terms of the power
relations at work in the planning arena, the MREC became much
more powerful once in place and so far harder, if not impossible, to
shift.
5.4. The Liaison Committee: towards a hybrid forum?
Throughout this article we have made reference to the Liaison
Committee. Despite the widespread adoption of liaison commit-
tees as ways of bringing together industrial and community
interests there has been very little social science research on them.
Such neglect is unfortunate since analysis of a liaison committee
provides us with insights into how networks and power work in
practice. Here we bring together actor perceptions of the MREC
Liaison Committee with social network analysis to provide a
rigorous evaluation of how a liaison committee operates. This
reveals how power plays out in practice. A liaison committee also
offers the potential to be what Callon et al. (2009) call a ‘hybrid
forum’ in which different types of expertise are brought together
and shared in an open and democratic forum. Our analysis of the
power relations within the Crymlyn Burrows Liaison Committee,
however, suggests the prospects for a genuinely hybrid forum were
undermined.
Before the licence was granted in 2002, EAW advised the setting
up of a liaison committee. It was an advisory measure given the
deeply contested nature of the development. In response to a
speciﬁc question about public participation, EAW (2013) gave
‘factual’ background on the MREC’s Liaison Committee:
‘‘Chaired by the general manager of the MREC, [the committee]
follows a structured meeting approach. [EA] regularly attend
the committee meetings members are drawn from local
residents, local Councillors and other interested parties.’’
At the time of its formation, the Committee was a public arena
where actors have a chance to express themselves, listen to others
and debate (membership of the committee is exclusive, however,
and members of local environmental NGOs are not invited). In a
true hybrid forum, new knowledge is acquired and shared, and
‘‘new ways of thinking, seeing, and acting must be developed,
pooled, and made available’’ (Callon et al., 2009, 33; Lane,
Landstro¨m, & Whatmore, 2011; Lane, Odoni, et al., 2011). This,
it is hoped, might begin to break down institutional and perceptual
barriers of power and expertise:
‘‘[Specialists] imagining that they are faced with an ignorant or
even obtuse public, take on the mission of enlightening and
instructing the other. The discussion established in hybrid
forums wrong foots this model. It demonstrates that both
categories of actors possess speciﬁc forms of knowledge (a
capacity for diagnosis, an interpretation of the facts, a range of
solutions) that mutually enrich each other’’ (Callon et al., 2009,
33).
There is, however, a tension between what the developer-
operators of the MREC facility wanted to achieve with the Liaison
Committee and what the dissenters come to regard it as. In the
early years of the committee, i.e. from 2002, the developer and
dissenter networks did not adopt the same or even similar
perspectives on science, engineering and risk. But they did at least
appear to respect and understand the position of others, as D1
recalls:
‘‘Occasionally there was a hostile exchange, but generally
speaking it was a good forum for getting views aired. And where
they wanted more information on something experts would
come in and give discussions and talks on it. It was good and I
think it’s pretty standard now to have these things especially
where there’s combustion plant’s involved.’’ (D1 Interview,
2009)
The Liaison Committee offered the potential for a hybrid forum
given the citizen scientists from the community, the developer-
operators, and other representatives of similarly-governed indus-
tries like the nearby Corus steelworks. As Callon et al. (2009, 35)
suggest, however, a hybrid forum must achieve certain things at a
minimum:
‘‘By fostering the unfolding of these explorations and learning
processes, hybrid forums take part in a . . . partial challenge at
least, to the two great typical divisions of our Western societies:
the division that separates specialists and laypersons and the
division that distances ordinary citizens from their institutional
representatives. These distinctions, and the asymmetries they
entail, are scrambled in hybrid forums . . . Thanks to this double
transgression, as yet unidentiﬁed overﬂows are revealed and
made manageable.’’
A functioning Liaison Committee in Crymlyn Burrows was seen
by EAW as an important step in the developers’ efforts at
governance of the plant. In particular, the Committee’s creation
in 2001 was meant to provide an opportunity for the developer to
reassure the community of the safety of producing energy from
waste. Early on, however, it brought the lead developer and council
waste planner, C1, and the co-developer, D1, into face-to-face
contact with individuals who had very different social construc-
tions of risk to their own:
‘‘They would try to trap you. There would be a public debate
going on. ‘Can you guarantee me there will be zero emissions
from this plant?’ I said ‘No, I can’t guarantee you there will be
zero emissions, there will be some emissions, but the risk of
impact is the same as a bolt of lightning hitting me. . .’ But
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because you cannot say indeﬁnitely it will be zero then there’s a
risk therefore [of] ‘No thank you’. . . . Reasonable argument goes
out of the door, it’s an emotional reaction. And that’s what we
were facing, no one was going to change their minds about it, no
way, and it was just a matter of making sure that we could build
faith and manage these risks sufﬁciently, which we didn’t do.’’
(D1 Interview, 2009)
So, could the Liaison Committee overcome this backdrop of
competing interpretations of risk to become a true hybrid forum? Or
would the developer and regulator networks simply exercise their
authority in their attempts to assuage community concerns? Or
would the Liaison Committee become a means by which the
community could express its concerns and bolster its power to
undermine the legitimacy of the EfW plant? To answer these
questions, we ﬁrst use SNA to examine how the Liaison Committee
worked, to ﬁnd out who participated, when they participated and to
draw out messages about how power was operating. We then
explore in more detail the perceptions of the Liaison Committee of
network actors, again to examine how power operates in a
community setting.
5.4.1. SNA and the Liaison Committee
We found that a closely bound group of community members
and two waste planners from NPTCBC were most involved in
meetings in this timeframe. This was after having undertaken a
two-mode analysis of attendees at Liaison Committee meetings
between 2001 and 2013 (see Section 3.3 for our methodological
approach). The social network and meetings revealed by the data
are shown in Fig. 16. Actors are displayed in red and meetings are
shown in blue. The data shows that a core of community dissenters
A1, A2 and A6 participated in 42 meetings out of the 56, A4
attended 39 while a waste planner from NPTCBC, C4, was at 26. As
we move through the meetings from M1 to M56, attendances from
this original core community group begin to fall away. This occurs,
especially from 2011 to the end of the data collection in 2013.
Fig. 16 reveals visually how the distance between the core
community members and the meetings increased over time,
showing how a gradual process of disengagement from the Liaison
Committee took place. Other network members, the co-developers
(the Cs and the Ds apart from C4) appear generally further away
from the core grouping of As. While individuals from the
regulatory network, the Es, from the Environment Agency, appear
most distant from the core community members and the meetings.
This picture is conﬁrmed by several SNA metrics. These include a
ﬁgure for the density of the entire graph in Fig. 16 over the full time
period of 0.161. This suggests a relatively fragmented network
structure given that density is a tally of all the network ties as a
proportion of all possible ties (cf. Rydin, 2013). In terms of
centrality, i.e. the number of links between each actor and each
meeting in this two-mode ﬁgure, we used Ucinet 6 to calculate the
degree of closeness for each actor in their network, i.e. the shortest
paths between these and other actors and the meetings. We also
did a calculation of betweenness for each of the top ﬁve actors in
each network to ﬁnd which actors were on the shortest paths
Fig. 16. Two-mode analysis in Ucinet 6 of actors and Liaison Committee meetings, 2001–2013.
Table 2
Three social network analysis indicators with top 5 actors in rank order for each.
Network Analysis types
Two-mode One-mode
Centrality indicators Importance
indicator
‘Closeness’ ‘Betweenness’ ‘Eigenvector’
Results Actors Results Actors Results Actors
Dissenter 0.797 A1 249.922 A2 0.374 A1
0.797 A2 216.618 A6 0.374 A6
0.764 A4 158.248 A4 0.370 A2
0.671 A5 148.725 A5 0.341 A4
0.797 A6 130.854 A8 0.264 A5
Developer 0.743 C5 194.152 C4 0.310 C4
0.733 C4 182.910 C5 0.284 C5
0.579 D4 159.706 D4 0.160 D14
0.561 D14 129.790 D14 0.140 D4
0.534 C1 88.627 D15 0.114 C1
Regulator 0.514 E13 78.303 E7 0.095 E13
0.495 E6 64.180 E6 0.074 E20
0.487 E1 62.280 E9 0.041 E22
0.482 E9 61.798 E13 0.040 E9
0.447 E8 60.370 E11 0.039 E16
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between the other actors and the meetings (cf. Rydin, 2013). These
results are shown in Table 2. The ﬁgures for both closeness and
betweenness reveal that there is a distinct level of similarity
amongst members of each network – dissenter, developer and
regulator – than between these networks. The ﬁgures for the
dissenter network show a high degree of commitment to each
other and to attending the Liaison Committee. In contrast, the
members of the regulatory network made up of staff from
Environment Agency Wales (EAW) are evidently less engaged
with one another and with EAW individuals being less able to
commit to repeated attendances at meetings.
In terms of an indication of the relative importance of individual
actors within their respective networks, we undertook a one-mode
eigenvector analysis in Ucinet 6. The results are shown in the right-
hand column of Table 2. This analysis further reveals distinct
differences between the dissenter and regulatory networks in
terms of the power of individuals’ association with each other. The
picture here is of a tightly-knit dissenter network versus a much
more loosely bound group of EAW ofﬁcers.
Fig. 16 also shows, unsurprisingly, that the most important
meetings attracted the greatest number of attendees. These
included the meetings that considered Environment Agency’s
decision to award a licence to the operator (e.g. 4th March, 2002, or
‘M7’) and the reaction to the 2003 ﬁre at the plant (22nd
September, 2003, or ‘M19’). With the dropping off of core
community dissenters on the Liaison Committee from meetings
from 2011 onwards, the wider community nonetheless remains
engaged, but the expertise of the core community dissenters has
gradually been lost after a decade’s attendance.
We also wanted to analyse the strength of the interactions
between individuals and their networks. In a one-mode analysis of
actor-by-actor relative associations (eigenvector/sum of cross
products) (see Fig. 17), the core community dissenter grouping of
A1, A2, A4 and A6 are shown in the top left box. The core
community’s peaks in this box represent the strength of
associations of these individuals through their attendance at the
same Liaison Committee meetings. Next, the Council’s waste
planning staff, in particular C4, are revealed in a co-developer’s box
immediately surrounding the dissenters box. C4’s peaks are lower
here, reﬂecting the lesser number of meetings attended overall. By
contrast, however, the individuals from the developers (the Ds),
also shown in the co-developer network box in Fig. 17, are even
less consistent in meeting attendance. The Environment Agency
(the Es), shown in the very outer L-shaped governance network
box in Fig. 17 attended the fewest meetings overall with only a
handful of individuals making more than three. This lack of
repeated attendance by the same staff was repeatedly commented
upon in interviews with community members who felt that EA
management lacked a commitment to longer term engagement.
Both Figs. 16 and 17, along with interviewee comments, provide
insights into how power and legitimacy are reproduced in a
community setting. The dissenters through their high level of
attendance reﬂected an aspiration to engage in the Liaison
Committee meetings despite their often well-stated cynicism
towards the other networks and the decision making process. The
community invested time and energy in this activity. From this
came an expectation within the community of reciprocal engage-
ment by other network actors. It was hoped that this would confer
political legitimacy on decisions being taken that would affect the
community. Whilst C4 from the Council’s waste planning team did
attend a signiﬁcant number of meetings, the core community
members repeatedly expressed in interview their disdain that
Fig. 17. One-mode eigenvector (sum of cross products) analysis of actors attending Liaison Committee meetings, 2001–2013.
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individuals representing the developers (the Ds) and the Environ-
ment Agency (the Es) rarely attended more than a few consecutive
meetings. This undermined the legitimacy of the Liaison Commit-
tee as a consultation body or one that could share knowledge or
decision-making power. It also deepened the pre-existing cynicism
of some community members that the Liaison Committee was
simply a ‘talking shop’ with little or no power at all.
From the perspective of the developers and the regulators, the
Liaison Committee has a rather different purpose. For both networks,
and particularly the former, the Liaison Committee acts as a forum to
communicate information on emissions, planned maintenance and
future investment on the site. It is not perceived as a body that will
share expertise or authority. Community-generated data, for
example, is dismissed as unscientiﬁc (cf. Wynne, 1996, Irwin &
Wynne, 1996). In Fig. 16, co-developers D1, D2 and D3 from the
Portuguese-owned company, HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd, are
shown to attend the early meetings when decisions on licensing
were being made. Later on, however, with the site recovering from
ﬁre damage in 2003, i.e. from the meeting on 22nd September, 2003
(’M19’), D7, D8 and D9 attend only infrequently (most of these
represent a public relations ﬁrm hired by HLC). By the end of the time
period, with HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd having gone into liquidation
in 2005 with £40m in debt, the only individual associated with the
development who is regularly attending meetings is C5, a waste
planner from NPTCBC because the Council became the sole owner-
operator. Individuals from HLC only attend haphazardly, just one or
two meetings before being replaced (their numbers go to ‘D16’
showing that 16 different people from the developer side attended
Liaison Committee meetings). The distinct peripherality of many of
the Cs and Ds, and all the Es, from the core community members and
the interactions at the meetings is shown numerically in Table 2 and
visually in Figs. 16 and 17.
In Fig. 17, the attendance of council waste planner C5, for
example, is indicated by the peaks in the ﬁrst L-shaped block
surrounding the dissenter network results which are shown in the
top left. The distinct peaks of C5 suggest that this individual was
expected to attend these meetings as part of their job. For those
whom attendance may be a more voluntary matter (e.g. the other
Cs and Ds) their engagement was signiﬁcantly lower. This suggests
that the co-developers (NPTCBC and HLC) are effectively able in
practice to marginalise the potential signiﬁcance of the Liaison
Committee despite its establishment being a licensing expectation
of the Environment Agency.
The most peripheral individuals to the Liaison Committee were
those from the Environment Agency. Fig. 16 shows that
Environment Agency staff members are distant from the meetings
in terms of their attendance and even more remote from the
regular core community attendees. Few Environment Agency staff
attended more than two or three meetings. Fig. 17 shows the
Environment Agency engagement with the Liaison Committee as
the low peaks and dispersed points to the right and bottom of the
ﬁgure. In terms of power relations this indicates a paradox: the
Environment Agency had requested that the developers to
establish a Liaison Committee but the lack of regular attendance
by familiar faces who might offer both continuity and legitimacy
appears to have undermined much of the potential for engagement
of the Liaison Committee.
Together, Figs. 16 and 17 (along with the qualitative data from
interviews with actors in all three networks) show an extremely
complex set of perceptions: the Environment Agency believes that
it has performed its role by encouraging the creation of the Liaison
Committee, the developers believe that they have co-operated
with the Environment Agency by creating the Liaison Committee
and using it to disseminate their information to the community,
and the dissenters believe that by engaging in the Liaison
Committee they will be able to share in power and authority over
the making of future decisions affecting the plant. Instead, as a
vivid illustration of asymmetric power relationships, there was
little or no sharing of knowledge or expertise, and there was no
enforcement of meaningful engagement by EAW, and so high
levels of cynicism and mistrust persisted for many in the
community. It is clear that the Liaison Committee did not, and
could not, perform in this context as a hybrid forum.
5.4.2. Exercising power in the Liaison Committee: regulatory and
developer networks
A positive relationship does exist between the regulatory-
network and the Liaison Committee. Emissions data provided by
the developer-operator and EAW is circulated relatively swiftly for
community consumption before it becomes more widely available.
From the point of view of some community representatives, the
Liaison Committee is a positive development. They are given access
to data in a useable form and can discuss its interpretation with the
operator, Environment Agency staff and others with technical
knowledge. This plays to the technical expertise that some in the
community have developed over time (cf. Irwin & Wynne, 1996).
The Liaison Committee, however, still falls short of what Callon
et al. (2009) expect of a hybrid forum. In a hybrid forum, expert
participants are expected to be completely open to alternative
framings of understanding of others. In this committee, as C1
describes below, the expertise of certain members with industrial
experience was not relinquished. The EAW stated in 2013 that the
Liaison Committee was ‘‘not a permit condition or a legal
requirement but is something that we would encourage’’ (EAW,
2013). Having used its power in 2001 to urge the developers to
create a committee, the Agency does not then discuss how, or even
if, it monitors the qualitative nature of exchanges for participants.
Nor does it appear to report publicly on how the micro-politics of
the changing picture of community and business representation is
taking place over time.
In terms of ‘following rules’, the council waste planner and co-
developer, C1, is following rules (or rather guidance) by continuing
with the Liaison Committee. C1 speaks about this at some length in
2012 (compared to not at all in 2009). This suggests that C1 and
colleagues are keener to talk about the work they do with the
community (but still not about the NGOs who remain actively
excluded):
‘‘I don’t think we have a problem with the Liaison Committee,
they understand that the plant itself is not a signiﬁcant risk. I
think that they, the majority on the Liaison Committee never
did believe the plant was a signiﬁcant risk. I mean we’ve got ex-
Corus employees on the Liaison Committee. We’ve got chemists
on the Liaison Committee. We’ve got people who have always
been on the Committee and who have always known what they
were talking about. The people who have been the vociferous
protesters if you like, have tended to drop off the Liaison
Committee over the years.’’ (C1 Interview, 2012)
Some learning amongst committee members took place around
alternative waste technologies such as gasiﬁcation and pyrolysis.
However, the alternative framing of risk of the community-based
dissenters has not been accommodated by those in the developer-
operator network. In fact, the comment above by C1 suggests that
the reverse may be true, i.e. the Liaison Committee like any other
has become subject to asymmetric power relations. Over time,
those individuals with a similar framing of risk to C1 (EAW also
attends) appear to have come to dominate matters in recent years.
The ‘protestor fatigue’ of the community-based dissenters, referred
to by C1, is strongly suggestive of only limited public participation,
i.e. tokenism, taking place with the committee (cf. Arnstein, 1969).
The public participation that is occurring is with individuals who,
by accident or design, are deemed to be more ‘acceptable’, i.e. less
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‘vociferous’ in their dissent. In interview in 2012, C1 stated a belief
that the previously most combative dissenters were no longer
contesting dioxin emissions. Instead, they were said to be solely
interested in pursuing a court case for environmental nuisance due
to site smells.
5.4.3. Contesting power in the Liaison Committee: the dissenter
network
There were initial hopes that the Committee could provide a
forum in which mutual learning could take and this included many
in the dissenter network (cf. Healey, 1997, 1998c, 2003). From a
community perspective, the Liaison Committee also offered the
potential to raise issues, and gain answers, with the plant operator
and regulator that they could not otherwise easily be done. So, for
instance, the Liaison Committee has been a place where emissions
data has been discussed when breaches occur. Rather early on,
though, a sense of disaffection with the Liaison Committee began
to set in amongst the dissenter network. This began with HLC’s
responses in the Committee minutes from 2003, for example,
which recorded the constrained agency of the community
dissenter network:
‘‘On being requested for a monthly [liaison] meeting, HLC [the
plant operator] regarded this as too frequent. The constitution
refers to quarterly meetings after six months of operation or at a
frequency as the committee may decide. A request for a mass
meeting was rejected by HLC. [Community member A4] reacted
against this decision. Discussion continued and a request for
rotating the Chairman and Secretary of the Liaison Group was
rejected by HLC. The purpose of the Liaison Committee
meetings is for executives of HLC (Neath Port Talbot) Ltd to
share relevant information to the residents Liaison group and
for the residents group to ask questions accordingly. [Commu-
nity members A4 and A1] left the meeting before the meeting
ofﬁcially ended.’’ (Point 4.2, Minutes, Liaison Committee
meeting, 22.9.03)
The comments of A1 are typical. There were claims that the
meetings were not been particularly illuminating especially when
something signiﬁcant has taken place on site:
‘‘All I get is minutes of meetings and [they] are very, very vague
. . . lots of things are left out . . . There was total denial from some
people, total denial from the company and sort of red faces from
the council representatives.’’ (A1 Interview, 2012)
Some dissenting community members have since dropped off
attending (see Fig. 16). These individuals felt for some time co-
opted into a process in which they no longer saw any prospect for
the kinds of changes that they originally hoped for taking place. For
example, provision of continuous monitoring of dioxins and more
meaningful levels of public participation.
‘‘The meetings have been dropped to every two or three months
now . . . [O]riginally the liaison meetings were monthly, but
there wasn’t much being spoken about. And the people running
the plant, the manager, they’re far more cooperative. We can, if
we want to go round and have a look at the place they’ll take us
round, try and identify where smells are coming from, where
noise is coming from, which affects only the local couple of
streets you know. It’s not a big thing for the whole community.’’
(A2 Interview, 2012)
The dissenting network has not been able to mobilise additional
resources or legitimacy through participation in the Liaison
Committee. It has not proved to be a forum in which they can
challenge the central principles of the plant’s initial approval or its
operation. At best, the Liaison Committee has been an opportunity
to scrutinise the day-to-day operation of the plant.
5.5. Reﬂections
Our reﬂections draw together our analyses. These are organised
around the three networks that we have studied. What our
longitudinal case study demonstrates is the continuity of the three
networks in terms of their membership, their relations within and
between one another and the resources that they draw upon to
promote their authority. In part, the persistence of the networks is
to be expected: regulatory and operational activities account for
the continuity of two networks. Similarly, for the dissenters, their
key source of concern – the perceived health risks arising from the
incineration of waste – did not disappear with the development’s
approval. The persistence of such concerns also helps to animate
the other two networks in a symbiotic way. Post-regulatory
decision analysis therefore matters in understanding how power
plays out in practice in communities. Power reproduces itself
through these networks. As we shall see, though, there is a
dynamism to these relations that has the potential to undermine
the dominant mode of governance suggested here, i.e. govern-
mentality, in the context of waste planning (cf. Bulkeley et al.,
2005).
5.5.1. Regulator
Environment Agency Wales (EAW) continues to perform a
procedural role in a governmentality framing. Its procedures are
practice oriented, expert-led, and focus on downstream risk
assessments (cf. Wynne, 1996, 2003). Before the development
approval for the MREC was given, EAW was constrained by not
offering genuinely meaningful engagement in upstream siting and
choice of technologies largely due to local politics and to the
dominant risk discourse. Once approval is given for the plant
enforcement of regulations becomes the Agency’s purpose. From a
dissenter perspective, enforcement is as problematic as licensing
because of poor resourcing and the ‘‘British approach’’ to
regulation (Bell & Mcgillivray, 2006, 298) in which a (deliberately)
under-resourced regulator can appear to be effectively ‘captured’
by industry (Macrory, 2014; Ogus & Abbot, 2002; Sherlock, Kirk, &
Reeves, 2004).
The Liaison Committee, a potential hybrid forum suggested by
EAW, has been used by actors and networks in ways that ﬁt with
the governmentality approach. For example, it was arguably a
means of controlling and/or mediating dialogue just before the
‘facts on the ground’ were to change with the start of the plant’s
construction in 2001. The dissenter network in part rejects the
forum as being a presentational talking shop (e.g. A1, B1
Interviews), but, post-decision, is unable to provide an alternative
bottom-up power structure/forum, such as a ‘rhizome’ (see below),
more especially given that the ‘facts’ have changed.
It would appear that the enforcement role, however, is proving
problematic for the EAW’s governmental role, laid down in
Whitehall and Cardiff, of helping keeping UK incineration policy
ticking over. If, as B4 suggests, the plant will continue to have
combustion problems so long as it’s running well below capacity,
then the MREC will likely risk further dioxin breaches and suffer
further shutdowns. In 2012, C1 talked of reviewing the entire
economic basis of the MREC. Closing the MREC would involve
signiﬁcant losses under the terms of the PFI contract. It would put
NPTCBC in breach of contract with Bridgend CBC. Closure would
also go against Whitehall’s stated national policy (enforced by the
Environment Agency) of promoting incineration as a way of
meeting EC landﬁll targets. While the dissenters are still asking for
the MREC to be closed on a precautionary basis, the current
operator (C1) has arranged for a tender based on ﬁnancial risk
management (WG, 2014). The battles over access to the emissions
data for communities around Crymlyn Burrows have evidenced,
for example: (i) poor public access to EAW records at the remote
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Llandarcy ofﬁce (B2), (ii) the allegedly poorly updated records (B2),
and (iii) an allegedly antiquated computer system (B2). This has
suggested that EAW’s slim resources may not be being prioritised
for the public registers, although this has been denied by EAW
(EAW, 2013). Nevertheless, EAW’s role can be broadly inferred as
being industry-focused, or less generously, captured by industry
(Ogus & Abbot, 2002, cf. Bell & Mcgillivray, 2006). The details of
these localised skirmishes still need to be seen as part of a much
bigger power struggle, i.e. how successfully can the UK’s pro-
incineration policy be made to work in very speciﬁc places?
Ultimately, the regulator and developer/operator remained
relatively closely aligned to each others’ interests, despite public
protestations to the contrary. Whether by bureaucratic failure
(most likely) or by design, EAW retains the power, ﬁrst seen in the
licensing phase which ended with a decision in 2002, to effectively
exclude dissenting voices through its data access policies. Both of
the other networks want a lot from the Agency, but as shown
below EAW appears institutionally unable to engender the trust
necessary to build more reciprocal relations with all stakeholders
in the MREC facility.
5.5.2. Operator
The plant operator (C1) continues to perform their role in
governmentality mode, i.e. within the conﬁnes of a striated or
proscribed space of governance fashioned by E1. When the facts on
the ground changed signiﬁcantly in 2002 with the licensing
decision, C1 made much of EAW’s ‘strict’ and continuing
governance regime – saying in essence ‘if there was a real problem
they’d shut us down’. There have been temporary plant closures,
but ceasing operations entirely due to pollution breaches is much
less likely. Shutdown would only take place if dioxin breaches were
framed in a precautionary way by the EAW, and only if the EAW
was devoting signiﬁcant – i.e. more than minimal – resources to
enforcement. Instead, breaches in permit levels are treated as a
technical problem but one which can be solved through improved
technologies or process management. For all C1’s protestations
about E1’s ‘strict’ levels of governance, C1 has still had some
latitude to lobby EAW on matters of C1’s interest.
Post-decision, C1 also makes much of the Liaison Committee (the
potential hybrid forum). They suggest this shows ‘commitment’ to
participation with the community (alongside a range of people from
business, like ex-Corus and laboratory staff, all with similar framings
of risk and experience of EAW as C1). However, the Committee is not
a space to fundamentally challenge the ‘normal science’ approach of
operator C1. Rather, it is a power-based forum that has been joined
by an ever-greater number of actors supportive of C1’s framings of
risk. The Committee therefore appears to be a useful forum for
limited exchanges (Arnstein, 1969) by those that created it where
access to data is contested, but a truly open forum where power and
expertise is set aside is not on offer. Despite enforcement notices and
threats of further regulatory action, the developer and regulatory
networks are close. This has ensured broader, continuing legitimacy
of the project as a development activity, but not for some in the
community. The latter appear unable to negotiate about EAW’s
regulatory framework in ways that the developer network can to
some degree.
What is lacking, largely because EAW (and the developer) have
not been able to engender trust is a creation of space for debate
between the three networks. The developers and regulators remain
distanced from dissenters. The debate remains polarised between
the camps. For a true hybrid forum to work, as Callon et al. (2009)
suggest, there needs to be conditions nurtured in which trust and
mutual respect can develop. Whilst the regulator and the
developer networks continue to pursue governance in this
governmental fashion in this particular place it seems unlikely
that such a shared negotiating space will be created.
5.5.3. Dissenters
As is evident from the discussion above, dissenters did not
realign with EAW after the development decision was made. At one
level, this is something of a surprise as both dissenters and EAW
had an interest in emissions from the plant. However, trust
between dissenters and EAW had been lost pre-2002 and did not
return afterwards. High and possibly idealistic expectations of
what a regulator could achieve on the part of the dissenters were
dashed in both periods largely by EAW’s governmental approach to
its role – it was expert-led and appeared uncommitted to seeing
meaningful public participation. Poor EAW resources also played a
key role in the dissenters’ discovery of the realpolitik of the ‘‘British
approach’’ to regulation (Bell & Mcgillivray, 2006, 298) – they
expressed frustration throughout that, in general, their calls for
tougher enforcement were not apparently heeded, and speciﬁcally
their demands for continuous or semi-continuous dioxin moni-
toring were refused (on grounds of cost and bureaucratic
procedure).
For the dissenters, the levels of distrust of other networks
remained high in the enforcement period. While the Liaison
Committee became the focus of debate over data, especially in
2006 and 2010, members of NGO1 were not allowed to sit on the
committee. Thus, the power to exclude was exercised by developer
and regulatory networks which, in combination with an apparent
refusal to step back from the power once conferred by expertise,
appear to have undermined opportunities for genuine engage-
ment. Instead, NGO1 members receive the minutes and participant
comments second hand. At the same time, some community
members on the committee, said they felt effectively co-opted into
a ‘talking shop’ that is unsatisfactory in terms of resolving each
sides’ alternative scientiﬁc framings and unable to achieve their
more radical initial aim of halting the project. In 2009 and 2012, the
community-based dissenters expressed frustration and fatigue at
this negotiated outcome.
Although there has not been a free and open exchange of views
on the Liaison Committee, there has, however, been a process of
mutual learning. To begin with there was not a shared sense of
purpose from participants. Initially there were deep asymmetries
in perceptions and practices of power. For the developer, the
committee provided an opportunity to communicate directly with
dissenters, with the hope that they could ‘bring them on side’.
Dissenters, meanwhile, wished to hold the operator to account for
their activities. Whilst the hopes of neither side have been fully
met, there have been some compromises which have arisen
through a shared learning experience. For dissenters, this involved
negotiating in the face of the demands of others. For example,
during the 2006, 2010 and 2012 emission events when data was
argued over, there was a degree of recognition amongst the
dissenters that they would not necessarily get the plant shut down.
Dissenters have had to ‘learn to compromise’ on their original
demands. The dissenters’ precautionary approach has forced them
to engage and, perhaps, better respect something of the alternative
expertise-led approach of the operator.
The record suggests that the evidence of this case study is that
power relations and the articulation of competing perspectives
that go with them continue to matter over time. Opportunities for a
true hybrid forum, where power relations dissolve and expertise is
set aside to a greater or lesser extent, were undermined at Crymlyn
Burrows because the Liaison Committee was created and main-
tained by two networks – those of the developer and regulator –
which have only extended an offer of dialogue to community
members and not all dissenters represented in the local
community (i.e. the local NGO). By encouraging a certain number
of business members to the forum who share the same perceptions
of risk management, whilst seeing more vociferous community
member participation fade, the developer-operator continues to
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undertake governmentality techniques created by EAW by
structuring both the means of engagement and the content and
framing of what is discussed.
It is worth reﬂecting a little further on the Liaison Committee. It
can help us to understand how power is played out at the local
level. In the licensing phase, when the MREC facility was built and
became ‘‘hard to shift’’ (B4 Interview, 2012), the EAW and the
MREC’s operators managed to create a landscape for public
participation with only one outlet – the Liaison Committee. This
was done in a governmental fashion, which was relatively low in
terms of Arnstein (1969) ladder of participation. In this case, the
perceived tokenism and lack of agency of the Liaison Committee
has forced some community-based dissenters to drop out through
campaign fatigue and/or disillusion. The present-day reality of the
Liaison Committee – a governmental procedure that results in
meaningful ‘engagement’ according to EAW – remains low on the
ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969) and some way from a
hybrid forum (Callon et al., 2009).
For the dissenters, there is now no alternative protest space.
Popular dissent, including a range of activities classed as civil
disobedience, ended when the IPPC license was granted in
2002. There are no bottom-up, alternative discussion groups in
the community campaigning or talking about the MREC except for
NGO1 (but no campaigning is active). The MREC Liaison Committee
is now the only forum which debates the plant’s activities.
Dissenters ﬁnd this unsatisfactory for reasons detailed above. Local,
potentially rhizomic, activity has been curbed because of the nature
of the governmentality approach pursued by central government
and its local agents, in this case, EAW. The result of the British
approach to regulation is that state/private networks are effectively
able to manage this local space. These can put down their own
‘cuttings’ (e.g. the Liaison Committee) – to continue the plant
metaphor – into the community to ‘manage’ the landscape of
dissent. In the case of the environmentalists and the citizen
scientists based in and around Crymlyn Burrows, it was a successful
strategy from the point of view of the regulator and the developer/
operator. However, there were times when direct action was
witnessed which, as we indicate from our case study, showed that
the authorities underplayed how the local landscape can or should
be managed (at least from a realist governmentality perspective).
6. Conclusions: limits to governmentality
This study takes as its starting point the ways that the planning
arena, and associated notions of the public interest, are typically
contested. Our review of the planning literature revealed the ways
that a focus on power relations offers a means of evaluating different
approaches to public participation. Understanding the myriad ways
that power as knowledge plays out in practice required that we
develop a nuanced approach that drew on a variety of theoretical
tools. This necessitated a theoretical overview of the nature of
contested framings of developments and how those relate to power
relations of varied actors in a range of networks over time. This
pluralistic theoretical framework demands much greater attention
being given to community histories (cf. Bickerstaff, 2012; Devine-
Wright, 2011; Simmons & Walker, 2005). We found that a dissenter
network embedded in a locality has longevity far beyond that of a
planning approval or licensing decision. Over several decades in the
same area in south-west Wales, the repeated siting of potentially
polluting industrial activities became something of a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy (cf. Walker, 1998, 2012). Community protests on the
border between Swansea and Neath-Port Talbot were repeatedly
faced by staff and politicians involved with these two local
authorities as well as the regulator, Environment Agency Wales
(EAW). To begin with, at least, a realist governmentality reading of
events most closely matched what actually took place on the ground
throughout, i.e. top-down, state-led governmental activity ulti-
mately overwhelming a long-running, bottom-up, community- and
NGO-led protest. The Marxist critique is powerful for understanding
the land-value basis for the initial siting decision (cf. Beck, 1999), and
the advocacy, radical/transactive and collaborative planning
approaches help to explain what should be done in terms of
boosting public participation in the application and licensing phases.
Adopting a longer term perspective to the case study, however, also
enables us to explore the way in which power is ‘‘spatial and subject
to the contingencies of events and relationships that may lie outside
the immediate here and now’’ (Allen, 2011, 17). The longitudinal
analysis demonstrates the value of a more nuanced approach to
power and that multiple tools need to be utilised to explore how
actors and networks interact. For instance, waste planners and the
regulator appeared to ‘want to get things done’ in a technocratic and
procedural fashion before considering doing them more equitably
through more meaningful public participation. The regulatory space
that these actors were able to carve out had its own set of power
relations, knowledge claims and norms. These aspects were often
distinct from those arising from interactions with oppositional
actors (Allen, 2009, 207). This suggests that planners need to operate
with a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches given
competing claims to knowledge, expertise and power, instead of
being caught in the silo mentality that sometimes exists in planning
theory (Ferreira, Sykes, & Batey, 2009; Rydin, 2007).
The case study showed a central government-led regulatory
network involving the EAW sharing a technocratic framing of risk
with the private sector. It continues to hold sway over the
Materials Recovery and Energy Centre (MREC), the energy-from-
waste (EfW) facility owned and operated by NPTCBC. The
administrative capacity of public and private bodies – their
capacity to reproduce repertoires of knowledge – contrasts starkly
with the fatigue that set in amongst many dissenters in the decade
since MREC received its licence. Along with declining enthusiasm
goes the individual and collective knowledge that has been
generated. The placement of potentially polluting processes in the
same geographic areas (Blowers, 2003; Walker, Mitchell, Fairburn,
& Smith, 2005), plus the bureaucratic hurdles faced by concerned
community members in terms of alternative frames of risk,
rationing access to decision-makers and the lack of resources do
suggest serious structural imbalances in the planning system for
those who are most likely to be affected by it.
The resources expended on ensuring the delivery of the MREC
demonstrate both the success and weaknesses of governmentality
in relation to waste incineration. Successes include the delivery of
the MREC in the face of a knowledgeable and well organised
community opposition. This was a key achievement in meeting
contemporary waste planning goals. Weaknesses that have been
revealed are the loss of credibility within the community of
governing bodies (the local planning authority, EAW) and of the
regulatory processes that they are entwined within. Furthermore,
the regulatory process and developer and regulatory networks
have been unable to stiﬂe the continuing debate over the operation
of the plant. However, our SNA results showed that the EAW’s
involvement in the Liaison Committee was relatively peripheral
and this point was raised by in interview by several community
members. Whilst the procedures of governmentality can be seen to
have been particularly successful in this case, as society changes
(cf. Beck, 1999), the erosion of trust in civic and private institutions
appears to be making it harder for adherence for local government
bodies to achieve their ends using governmentality. Our longitu-
dinal case study approach has demonstrated how in governing
spaces tensions are also created within governmentality (see also
Bulkeley et al., 2005). In Crymlyn Burrows these crises of
legitimacy have arisen since at least the 1960s. Local strategies
of resistance are becoming ever more nuanced and therefore if
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ignored harder to deal with. As we have seen, the regulatory and
developer networks fail to sufﬁciently recognise the salience of
spatial issues. This includes the ways that power relations operate
in networks. Links and social capital embedded in them (via the
norms of trust, reciprocity and mutuality, for example) are
continually made and remade (Rydin & Falleth, 2006). The power
to selectively include and exclude certain actors, for example,
shapes networks by altering the inter-dependencies between
actors (Rydin, 2013). For the regulatory and developer networks,
regulation (such as EIA or licensing) takes place in a uniform
manner – the privileging of procedure – wherever it occurs. The
dissenter network, though, prioritises local space and its signiﬁ-
cance. Quite simply, for them and for us, local issues matter. The
dissenter network responded to the intrusion of regulatory and
developer power in the community by seeking to construct its own
power relations which for the most part work within regulatory
and governmental norms. Even so, there were a number of points
up until 2002 in the Crymlyn Burrows case study when local
resistance to the MREC was at a tipping point between protesting
within and outside the system.
We conclude, therefore, that, based upon our case study of an
Energy-from-waste (EfW) plant in west Wales, there are limits to
the governmentality approach. More meaningful public participa-
tion can be achieved with ‘hard-to-reach’ communities, but only
when the dynamic and asymmetric nature of power relations are
appreciated in their local context. And, ultimately, given our SNA
analysis which revealed the more disengaged approach of the
regulatory network compared to that of the dissenter network, it
seems that this mismatch in engagement undermined the
credibility and legitimacy of the regulator and so weakened its
efforts at public engagement pre- and post- the development and
licensing decisions.
6.1. Implications for planning practitioners
The detailed evidence revealed in our case study has successfully
highlighted several important, linked social activities at work. A
mixed method research design helped with our unique, interdisci-
plinary approach which drew on qualitative interview material and
a range quantitative data. A social constructivist picture emerged
linking several social processes together revealing what takes place
when communities are faced with developments that are perceived
to have a signiﬁcant degree of environmental risk. This picture,
where power relations inevitably predominated, is a much more
useful characterisation of the ensuing, polarised land-use dispute
than one based on a typical and often simplistic dualism of ‘there is
no alternative’ (TINA) versus ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY)
(Bickerstaff, 2012). In such case study examples, trust in public
and private institutions can be shown to have been signiﬁcantly
eroded for many sections of the local community. In Crymlyn
Burrows, we saw this trust deﬁcit as part of a decades-long lack of, or
breakdown in, reﬂexivity. This lack of reﬂexivity amongst the
dissenter network was closely linked to the deeply ingrained sense
of social injustice due to potentially polluting industry having been
imposed upon the area in a governmental fashion for many years. It
was also linked to the markedly divergent framings of environmen-
tal health risk and associated scientiﬁc practice which were held by
each side. Tactically, the politically disaffected dissenters who
experienced the imposition of a development into their community
via what they regarded as a heavy-handed display of political/
governmental power, chose to ﬁght the development on the basis of
contested science and became so-called citizen scientists (cf. Irwin &
Wynne, 1996; Keller, 2009; Wynne, 1996). Others, meanwhile, took
more direct political action. Given the asymmetric power ranged
against them, the dissenters almost inevitably lost most of the
battles that they faced within the planning system. However, they
arguably won the war given the MREC plant’s crippling costs to its
owner, Neath-Port Talbot County Borough Council (NPTCBC) and the
signiﬁcant loss of legitimacy when the MREC was revealed by the
regulator, Environment Agency Wales (EAW), to have been
repeatedly in breach of agreed dioxin output levels on several
occasions over a number of years.
The lessons of Crymlyn Burrows for professional planners are
four-fold. First, with such developments, self-organising resistance
and dissent must be anticipated by certain interest groups. From the
very start, the planning process will likely be antagonistic. Second,
this suggests that professional planners should consider adapting
their favoured modus operandi and reﬂexively consider developing
several modi operandi based upon their own discretionary view of
the most appropriate theoretical planning perspective needed for a
particular situation (Ferreira et al., 2009; Rydin & Pennington, 2000).
Given that irreconcilable land-use conﬂicts mediated via the
planning system are commonplace, should alternative modes of
planning practice based, for example, on conﬂict theory not be made
accessible through planning schools? Third, in the case of
developments like that at Crymlyn Burrows, where support for
rival networks polarised very quickly, the more empowering
stakeholder based on a consensual, Habermasian approach would
not have been the most appropriate perspective to work with (cf.
Flyvbjerg, 1996). This is, of course, not to say that collaborative
planning does not have a place – it is simply one mode of operation.
However, at Crymlyn Burrows, the members of the various networks
did not initially want to get around the table. When they did, the
mutual recriminations continued. Their framings of risk, expertise,
scientiﬁc practice and environmental justice were simply too far
apart for mutual engagement: there was nothing for them to
reﬂexively build trust upon. Finally, this case study raises the
question of what stakeholder engagement might achieve for both
planning theory and practice. Another study on a waste develop-
ment from South Wales (e.g. Chadderton, Elliott, Hacking, Shepherd,
& Williams, 2013) suggests community participation in planning,
when the local authority is also the developer, is equally poor. The
temptation to exclude voices via planning system machinery and
with ‘non-decision making’ bodies like liaison committees remains
strong (cf. Harvey, 2010). The ‘‘British approach’’ to environmental
regulation, based on relatively low levels of resources given by the
state for enforcement, also continues (Bell & Mcgillivray, 2006, 298).
However, in an age of austerity, the Environment Agency has even
less resources (cf. Porritt, 2015). Ultimately, land-use conﬂicts
remain wicked problems for practitioners. But, given that the very
costly events in Crymlyn Burrows were the result of a central
governmental policy stretched to breaking point in one particular
region, opting to pursue a more reﬂexive community engagement
strategy in future ought to be an obvious way forward for the
planners on the ground.
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